Cyber Security Newsletter 2021-02-22

[2021-02-18] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM) will establish a new state cyber security department joining the current state information systems department (RISO) and the information society services development department.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/valitsus-korrastab-digiriiki-luuakse-uus-riiklik-kuberturvalisuse-osakond/
[2021-02-18] The LokiBot malware is being distributed using a spoofed e-mail address of the TalTech rector. The phishing email is written in good Estonian and as a pretext invites recipients to participate in a procurement. As a response, TalTech has enabled DMARC so that recipients could detect emails from spoofed @taltech.ee addresses.
https://www.taltech.ee/uudised/tahelepanu-tallinna-tehnikaulikooli-rektori-nime-alt-tulnud-hinnaparingud-petukirjad-ja
https://taltech.ee/en/news/attention-price-inquiries-sent-under-name-rector-taltech-are-e-mail-scam-and-university-asks
https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/92598139/kustuta-kohe-petukiri-korgel-tasemel-tehnikaulikooli-rektori-tiit-landi-nime-alt-laks-tana-teele-massiliselt-libaparinguid
[2021-02-17] An information security specialist of Viljandi Hospital raised a privacy issue of PDF and DDOC signature files being sent for validation to RIA validation service SiVa. According to RIA, data is not permanently stored on RIA servers and the DigiDoc4 client explicitly asks for permission before the file is sent to RIA. The DDOC file validation logic has been moved server side to simplify the DigiDoc4 client-side software. On a side note, people have forgotten that a few years ago, all documents signed using Mobile-ID were sent to the SK DigiDocService.
https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1026090/paranoia-voi-suure-venna-sund-digiallkirja-kehtivuse-kontrollimiseks-laheb-dokument-kogu-taiega-riigi-katte-miks
[2020-02-16] At the end of 2020, an ID card authentication bypass flaw was found in the Coop Pank’s internetbank environment. Since Coop Pank also provides a bank link authentication service, the eesti.ee e-service and other e-services supporting the bank link option were also affected. A similar flaw was also found in elisa.ee, printincity.ee and arved.ee.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cObPmkK7zaY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQ5UK2VwN4w
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/coopi-internetipangas-oli-turvaauk-mis-voimaldas-ligipaasu-voora-inimese-kontole/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/coop-pank-turvaviga-sai-operatiivselt-parandatud-interneti-ja-mobiilipanga-kasutamine-on-taiesti-turvaline/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/turvaauk-elisa-iseteeninduses-ning-arved-ee-keskkonnas-voimaldas-paaseda-voorale-kontole/
[2021-02-12] In January 2021, Estonian banks lost more than 200 thousand euros in Smart-ID and Mobile-ID phishing attacks.
https://majandus24.postimees.ee/7178741/pangakelmustega-peteti-eesti-inimestelt-jaanuaris-valja-ule-200-000-euro
[2021-02-10] The personal data of 5000 persons was leaked from the Mineral Garden (mineralgarden.org – Living Minerals OÜ) online store. The names, email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and shopping cart information of thousands of Mineral Garden customers were searchable on Google. The Data Protection Inspectorate initiated a supervisory procedure. The shop is controversial as it distributes a harmful substance advertised as a miracle cure. Postimees published the name of a parliament member, who was found in the leak to have purchased the substance.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/hiiglaslik-andmeleke-mmsi-tellinud-klientide-andmed-rippusid-avalikult-internetis/
https://leht.postimees.ee/7176185/nimed-telefoninumbrid-aadressid-tuhandete-eesti-veebipoe-klientide-andmed-rippusid-avalikult-internetis
[2021-02-10] From March 2021, RIA will stop supporting bank link in the state authentication service TARA, because the security of bank link authentication mechanisms has not been assessed according to eIDAS regulation. The change will affect approximately 7000 people, which accounts for about 1% of all authentications in TARA. This move has been long awaited as the use of banks as authentication providers has never had legal basis and security flaws in banking systems have put personal data, that is accessible through the bank link, at risk.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/1-martsist-ei-saa-teatud-riiklikesse-e-teenustesse-pangalingi-kaudu-siseneda.html
https://www.ria.ee/en/news/1-march-it-will-no-longer-be-possible-access-certain-public-e-services-bank-link.html
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/osasse-riiklikesse-e-teenustesse-ei-saa-alates-martsist-pangalingi-kaudu-siseneda.html
https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/92520083/alates-1-martsist-ei-paase-pangalingiga-enam-38-e-teenusesse-sh-riigiportaali
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigiteenustesse-ei-saa-pangalingiga-martsist-enam-siseneda-pohjuseks-euroopa-liidu-seadus/
https://news.err.ee/1608104449/some-public-e-services-cannot-be-accessed-via-a-bank-link-from-march
[2021-02-05] The litigation between PPA and the Estonia ID card manufacturer Gemalto has reached a compromise with Gemalto paying the state 2.2 million EUR in compensation. While the press release only mentions the ID card security incident in 2017, the compromise also covers the claim against Gemalto regarding private key generation outside the ID card.
https://www.politsei.ee/en/news/a-settlement-agreement-has-been-signed-between-the-police-and-border-guard-board-and-gemalto-ag-tallinn-2021
https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/92482559/politsei-loobus-hiigelhagist-gemalto-vastu
https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/92191151/see-pole-enam-isegi-naljakas-moodunud-on-kaks-aastat-ja-kohus-pole-joudnud-politsei-ja-gemalto-kohtuasjas-mitte-kuskile
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/vigaste-id-kaartide-tootja-gemalto-maksab-eesti-riigile-22-miljonit-eurot-huvitist/
https://www.err.ee/1608099706/ppa-ja-gemalto-joudsid-kokkuleppele-ettevote-maksab-2-2-miljonit-eurot
https://news.err.ee/1608100102/gemalto-ppa-reach-compromise-over-id-card-security-weakness
[2021-02-03] RIA fixed an authentication man-in-the-middle flaw in the ID card browser signing extension. The flaw (a feature to sign raw values using the authentication key) was quietly introduced in 2017 without a proper security analysis. Swedbank began using the feature to authenticate their clients at the end of 2020, because it was considered to be more reliable than TLS client certificate authentication.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qr638sbaZ_M
https://www.ria.ee/en/news/information-system-authority-ria-and-its-partners-fixed-critical-bug-id-card-browser-extension.html
https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/swedbank-kasutas-turvanorkusega-id-kaardi-laiendust-kaks-aastat-pank-pidas-seda-tookindlamaks/
[2021-02-03] Geenius wrote an article about the recent repeated failures of revoking ID cards of deceased persons. RIA in 2019 initiated a supervisory procedure which still has not been completed.
https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/teist-korda-jaid-hulga-surnud-inimeste-id-kaartide-sertifikaadid-kehtetuks-tunnistamata/
[2021-01-25] CERT-EE reported that in December 2020, an ID card authentication bypass flaw was found in the website of quick loan provider (credit24.ee), which would have provided the opportunity to take a quick loan on behalf of a stranger.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/detsembris-lahendati-oluline-turvanorkus-kiirlaenu-pakkuja-veebilehel.html
https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/92359667/kiirlaenu-pakkuja-veebilehel-avastati-ohtlik-turvanorkus
[2021-01-26] Liisa Past and Jan Willemson from Cybernetica, in the Digital Government podcast (30min), talk about the historical and cognitive aspects of i-voting and explain how technology and math ensure a secure and trustworthy solution.
https://www.buzzsprout.com/1191800/7491415-what-makes-online-voting-secure
[2021-01-25] Estonian server hosting company Zone.ee experienced a DDoS attack. The attack lasted a total of five hours and affected the company’s operations.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-serverimajutusettevote-on-aktiivse-ddos-runnaku-all/
[2021-01-25] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM), the State Information System Authority (RIA) and the State Electoral Service (RVT) signed a cooperation agreement to define the division of tasks between the agencies for organizing i-voting security. MKM will organize a security audit. RVT undertakes the development of the i-voting system and organization of security testing and risk analysis. RIA will provide hosting services and perform security testing and logging. RVT and RIA will undertake the procurement of a technical and legal analysis of the possibility of voter identification by facial biometrics. The analysis should be conducted by 1 June 2021.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/mkm-ria-ja-rvt-solmisid-koostoolepingu-e-valimiste-kuberturvalisuse-korraldamiseks.html
[2021-01-24] The Estonian government recently fell and a new one was formed with a new Minister of Foreign Trade and IT: Andres Sutt (Reform). The political position on i-voting has now significantly changed as the coalition agreement seeks to develop a mobile app for i-voting.
https://news.err.ee/1608084379/who-s-who-estonia-s-new-government
https://news.err.ee/1608086476/coalition-agreement-center-reform-government-2021-2023
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1353315211571294213
[2021-01-14] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM) announced a public procurement tender for the audit of the i-voting system. The purpose of the audit is to get a reasoned assessment of the security of the election information systems and proposals for improvements that can raise the level of security. The audit shall be performed by internationally renowned auditors and information security specialists. The deadline for presenting the project’s final report is October 1, 2021.
https://news.err.ee/1608073477/ministry-seeking-international-auditor-to-check-security-of-e-elections
[2021-01-05] On 2021-01-05, Smart-ID, Mobile-ID and ID-card authentication and signing services were disrupted for a few hours. The state does not know the reason behind the failures and did not answer whether the question of whether a supervisory procedure will be initiated against SK ID Solutions AS.
https://majandus24.postimees.ee/7147961/riiklikud-autentimisteenused-olid-hairitud
https://news.err.ee/1228642/disruptions-in-use-of-mobile-id-still-possible
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-ei-tea-pohjust-miks-oli-mobiil-id-ja-id-kaardi-too-korraga-hairitud/
[2021-01-04] On 2021-01-04, SK ID Solutions AS failed to rotate the OCSP signer’s certificate, as a result, for 10 hours OCSP responses were signed with an expired certificate.
https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/News/certifier-esteid2018-validity-information-responses-were-signed-with-an-expired-certificate/
[2020-12-22] A research article by Valeh Farzaliyev, Kristjan Krips and Jan Willemson (Cybernetica): “Developing a Personal Voting Machine for the Estonian Internet Voting System”. The article describes a proof-of-concept i-voting client implemented on a microcontroller. The client only supports Mobile-ID for casting an i-vote. The source code of the client and build instructions have been published in GitHub.
https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/votingclient-final.pdf
https://github.com/Valeh2012/PersonalVotingMachine
[2020-12-18] RIA has published a technical report produced by Cybernetica: “Analysis of planned architectural changes in Open-eID”. The work analyzes the proposed alternative to TLS certificate authentication – authentication using a new web browser extension that RIA is currently developing.
https://web-eid.gitlab.io/analysis/webextensions-main.pdf
[2020-12-04] The Data Protection Inspectorate (AKI) initiated a supervisory procedure against the Health Board (TA) in connection with the COVID-19 data leak of 9158 persons. However, the Health Board will not be fined, because AKI does not have the power to fine another state agency.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/suur-isikuandmete-leke-ei-too-terviseametile-trahvi-kaela/

Cybersecurity related master’s theses in University of Tartu 2021 (January)

Student: Jayavarshini Thirumalai (Cyber Security MSc)
Title: An integrated approach for certification and re-certificationbased on the case study
Supervisor: Liina Kamm, Mari Seeba
Reviewer: Raimundas Matulevičius

Student: Valeh Farzaliyev (Computer Science MSc)
Title: Towards Practical Post-Quantum Voting Protocol: Shorter Exact Lattice-Based Proof of a Shuffle
Supervisor: Dominique Unruh, Jan Villemson
Reviewer: Janno Siim

Student: Jamil Gurbanzade (Computer Science MSc)
Title: Malicious Android app for security testing
Supervisor: Alo Peets
Reviewer: Denizalp Kapisiz

Cyber Security master’s theses defense in TalTech (January 2021)

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Cybersecurity curriculum MSc theses defences on January 11th 2021 (online):

Time: 9:30
Student: Electra Zoe Karamargin
Title: Going dark: a Forensic Analysis of Biometric Asset Management within Smart Eyewear, toward the Rising Conflict Between Security Through Privacy by Design and Forensic Investigation
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Matthew Sorell

Time: 10:10
Student: Siim Sarv
Title: Using Event Correlation to Detect Security Incidents from Windows Workstations
Supervisor: Risto Vaarandi
Reviewer: Toomas Lepik

Time: 10:50
Student: Alvaro-Wim Schuller Fernandez
Title: Developing a Scada Testbed from a Design Science Approach
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Andrew Roberts

Time: 12:00
Student: Jaanus Kääp
Title: Hyper-V VMBus Based Traffic Interception and Fuzzing
Supervisor: Sille Laks
Reviewer: Bernhards Blumbergs

Time: 12:40
Student: Kapil Yadav
Title: Information Security Management for Teleworking in Small and Medium Enterprises during the COVID-19 Crisis
Supervisor: Kaie Maennel
Reviewer: Adrian Venables

Time: 13:20
Student: Ivo Malve
Title: Dark Triad in Central Route to Persuasion: a Personality-based Phishing Susceptibility Study
Supervisor: Kieren Lovell
Reviewer: Stefan Sütterlin

Time: 14:15
Student: Anastasiya Kornitska
Title: Exploring How to Establish Cross-functional Teams for Cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Rain Ottis

Time: 14:55
Student: Arefeh Fathollahi Kalkhoran
Title: A Systematic Process to Improve Data Loss Prevention in a Large Organization
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Tiia Sõmer

Time: 15:35 (withdrawn)
Student: Furkan Atlas
Title: A Comparative Study: Evaluating the Efficiency of Looking Glasses in Helping Monitor BGP Attacks
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Toomas Lepik

Cyber Security Newsletter 2021-01-04

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[2020-12-30] A new version of the Election Information System (VIS) is being developed which will introduce an electronic list of voters making it possible to cancel an already given i-vote on election day with a paper vote. News portal Geenius tried to establish whether the authorities are performing background checks on the employees of private companies, Nortal and Cybernetica, involved in the development of the information systems for elections. Not clear whether such checks are needed as the security of the elections should not depend on the integrity of the developers.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kas-valimiste-infosusteemide-arendajate-taust-on-riigile-teada-riigiasutused-keerutavad/
[2020-12-29] Äripäev’s Russian-language website dv.ee experienced a large-scale DDoS attack. Äripäev’s editor-in-chief believes that the attacks are related to the published story about cryptocurrency millionares in Ida-Viru.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/aripaev-sattus-parast-ida-viru-kruptomiljonaride-uurimise-kajastamist-kuberrunnaku-ohvriks/
[2020-12-28] Arnis Parsovs (UT) has published the draft of his PhD dissertation “Estonian Electronic ID card and its Security Challenges”.
https://cybersec.ee/storage/phd_idcard.pdf
[2020-12-22] An anonymous interview was given for the Kanal 2 television channel where the coronavirus vaccine plan was criticized. The Health Board used a freeware program downloaded from the Internet to remove the voice distortion added to anonymize the source. As a result, the whistle blower was identified and asked to resign from the Health Board.
https://leht.postimees.ee/7139982/terviseametist-vallandatud-simmo-saar-naitab-napuga-sotsiaalministeeriumi-suunas
https://news.err.ee/1215910/health-board-comms-chief-asked-to-resign-after-criticizing-vaccine-plan
[2020-12-18] The Minister of Finance Martin Helme (EKRE) said that Estonian e-elections are not verifiable. The head of the state electoral service refuted the statements of the minister.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/martin-helme-eesti-e-valimised-ei-ole-kontrollitavad-ning-neil-puudub-vaatlemise-voimalus/
[2020-12-16] Sten Mäses (TalTech) defended his PhD thesis “Evaluating Cybersecurity-Related Competences through Simulation Exercises”.
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/et/Item/b4c33d3b-e7ce-48ad-98ad-a0add5e571a3
[2020-12-16] For years, an IT employee with a state secret permit mined cryptocurrency at the Ämari air base, bought expensive equipment with the Estonian defense budget and smuggled computer components out of the base to sell them in online forums. The purchased goods were not accounted for in the air monitoring division. From 2015 until his arrest in January 2019, the man illegally used devices belonging to the Defense Forces to extract cryptocurrencies worth 30,404 euros and misappropriated at least 190 devices with the total value of 48,935 euros.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/91976323/it-mees-armaani-tegi-eesti-kaitserahaga-osturallit-ja-avas-amaris-salajase-kruptorahakaevanduse
[2020-12-08] The Ministry of Interior sells the residence addresses entered in the population register to commercial enterprises for the purpose of sending advertisements or invitations to participate in surveys. Names, e-mail addresses, dates of birth and personal identification codes are not disclosed to the companies, but the addresses can be purchased by specifying the characteristics such as age, gender and mother tongue. People can opt-out by restricting access to their data in the e-service at rahvastikuregister.ee. In 2019, the data was sold to five customers and the state earned 8,205 EUR.
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/riik-muutis-inimeste-aadressid-ariks-siseministeerium-muub-rahvastikuregistri-andmeid-otsepostitusfirmadele?id=91904305
[2020-12-07] The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) allowed an active intelligence officer to give an interview to Postimees. The interview followed strict secrecy rules and Postimees did not learn the agent’s identity. This activity is likely related to the job ads recently put out by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service.
https://news.postimees.ee/7127281/estonian-intelligence-operative-our-special-tool-is-our-brain
[2020-12-07] The 6th Interdisciplinary Cyber Research conference took place in a semi-online format. The video recordings and proceedings are available.
https://www.taltech.ee/en/icr2020
[2020-12-02] By exploiting a flaw in the content management software Drupal, attackers compromised servers of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attackers downloaded 350GB of data from a total of 11 servers. The data mostly consisted of the data in the document management system. However, the attackers were also able to download a database containing data about 9158 corona-positive persons and their close contacts, that was stored as a LimeSurvey database in the Drupal instance of the Health and Welfare Information Systems Center (TEHIK). RIA initiated supervision proceedings, the Data Protection Inspectorate initiated its own proceedings and the Central Criminal Police initiated criminal proceedings of obtaining illegal access to the systems. Members of Parliament suspected that data from the national car registry had also been leaked, but this information was not confirmed.
https://news.err.ee/1192411/three-government-ministries-came-under-cyber-attack-in-november
https://news.postimees.ee/7123666/cybercriminals-attack-three-ministries
https://news.err.ee/1193476/november-s-cyber-attack-left-foreign-ministry-intranet-unmolested
https://www.err.ee/1192309/riigi-vastu-toimusid-kuberrunded-katte-saadi-9158-koroonapatsiendi-andmed
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ria-mkm-ei-kasutanud-infoturbe-osas-parimaid-praktikaid-algatasime-jarelevalvemenetluse/
https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/koroonapositiivsete-andmed-lekkisid-limesurvey-teenusest-terviseamet-lopetas-selle-kasutamise/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ministeerium-lukkab-riigikogulase-kahtlustuse-umber/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigikogulaseni-joudis-info-et-kuberrunnaku-kaigus-saadi-katte-rohkem-infot-kui-seni-on-oeldud/
[2020-12-01] RIA is developing an environment which will provide the possibility of installing additional smart card applications on the ID card. There are about four companies working on the creation of apps. The proof of concept will be completed by March 2021. RIA will not charge for apps, but it is possible that the use of the app will require a certain fee to be paid to the companies providing the apps.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tulevast-aastast-saab-id-kaardile-appe-installida/
[2020-12-01] Internet shops of pharmacies Apotheka, Südameapteek and Azeta.ee allowed anyone to query another person’s prescriptions by entering their personal ID code. The Data Protection Inspectorate issued a precept-warning with a one-day compliance deadline and a penalty payment of 100,000 euros to these three pharmacy chains. The chains complied with the precept by the deadline and suspended the possibility for buying a prescription drug for another person from the e-pharmacy.
https://www.aki.ee/et/uudised/andmekaitse-inspektsioon-kohustas-e-apteeke-lopetama-koheselt-ligipaas-teise-inimese
https://www.err.ee/1196452/e-apteekidest-enam-teistele-inimestele-retseptiravimeid-osta-ei-saa
https://arileht.delfi.ee/news/uudised/vooraste-inimeste-retseptiinfot-avaldavad-apteegid-said-riigilt-hoiatuse?id=91845429
[2020-12-01] Citizen Lab reported that the Estonian Education and Research Network (EENet) hosts Circles surveillance technology that exploits weaknesses in the global mobile phone system SS7 to track people’s phone calls, text messages and location, from anywhere. The technology is sold only to governments, therefore the best guess is that it has been purchased by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service to spy on targets abroad. RIA, who are the end-users of the IP addresses, acknowledged that they were used by RIA’s “contract partners”, but refused to name them. Since RIA refused to clarify whether the use of these IPs complied with the EENet’s network policy, EENet blocked traffic to these IPs.
https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/running-in-circles-uncovering-the-clients-of-cyberespionage-firm-circles/
https://epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/91851591/suur-vend-jalgib-aga-keda-uurijad-paljastasid-hamarat-nuhkimissusteemi-kasutavad-valitsused-nimekirjas-on-ka-eesti
https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/voimalikule-eesti-nuhkimissusteemile-tombasid-kriipsu-peale-haridusametnikud?id=91877113
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1333861285725921292
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ekspert-nuhkvarast-circles-riigil-on-tagauksed-niigi-olemas-tuvastamisel-piiraksid-telekomid-selle-kasutamist/
https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/ria-keeldus-teisele-riigiametile-utlemast-miks-nad-jooksutavad-nende-susteemides-salajast-nuhkvara/
[2020-11-27] EveryPay AS, which offers payment solutions for Estonian e-shops (used by mTasku), made a mistake which resulted in the bank accounts for a few hundred people being emptied. According to the company, it was a human error in the development which the automatic tests did not catch. All affected customers have received a refund.
https://raha.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-maksevahendaja-eksitus-tuhjendas-monesaja-inimese-pangakonto/
[2020-11-21] Õhtuleht journalists tailed a ministerial car to reveal its misuse. The Minister of Justice asked the Prosecutor General to have the journalists’ activities investigated on the basis of section 137 of the Penal Code – the section on unauthorized surveillance. The Minister of Justice later claimed that this was a misunderstanding.
https://news.err.ee/1161772/journalists-association-justice-minister-reps-probe-a-press-freedom-threat
https://news.err.ee/1162648/prosecutor-s-office-will-not-open-proceedings-against-ohtuleht-journalists
[2020-11-21] A book chapter by Kärt Salumaa-Lepik (TalTech), Tanel Kerikmäe (TalTech) and Nele Nisu (Ministry of Social Affairs): “Data Protection in Estonia”.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265-407-5_3
[2020-11-20] IT minister Raul Siem (EKRE) proposed using face recognition in i-voting to cut out voter fraud. The Electoral committee responded that the idea is not bad, but may be expensive. RIA supports the idea of using biometrics to identify a person, but acknowledged that this requires in-depth analysis.
https://www.err.ee/1161445/raul-siem-tahab-e-valimistel-hakata-inimesi-kaameraga-tuvastama
https://news.err.ee/1161488/it-minister-smartphone-camera-verification-would-cut-out-voter-fraud
https://news.err.ee/1162239/electoral-committee-face-verification-idea-not-bad-but-expensive
https://news.err.ee/1164544/kaimar-karu-face-recognition-could-be-added-to-e-voting-but-should-it
https://news.err.ee/1196515/it-entrepreneur-doubts-over-e-voting-reliability-is-political-issue
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1329733968099299328
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ria-toetab-biomeetria-kasutamise-motet-isiku-tuvastamisel/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/itli-president-krull-naotuvastusega-e-valimised-ei-ole-rahvahaaletuse-ajaks-realistik-soov/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/it-minister-siem-e-haaletamine-peab-koigile-kattesaadav-olema/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kaimar-karu-naotuvastusega-e-valimiste-teema-tostatus-juba-sel-ajal-kui-mina-olin-minister/
[2020-11-17] RIA held an online information day. Among the topics covered: new ID card browser extension; new CDOC 2.0 encryption format; new Mobile-ID solution; remote ID card certificate update and remote applet loading; the states authentication service TARA; the new information security standard. The video recordings and the transcribed Q&A are available.
https://blog.ria.ee/kusimused-ja-vastused-ria-infopaeva-esimene-paev-17-11-2020/
https://blog.ria.ee/kusimused-ja-vastused-ria-infopaeva-teine-paev-18-11-2020/
[2020-11-16] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM) is planning an independent audit and security analysis on i-voting, however, the details of the audit are still unclear. The ministry plans to propose a model where the security management of i-voting will be two-stage – RIA organizes cyber security and MKM checks the whole process and gives the National Electoral Committee an opinion on whether cyber security is organized at a sufficient level to use electronic systems for conducting elections.
https://news.err.ee/1159591/economics-affairs-ministry-looking-to-tighten-up-e-voting-security
https://mkm.ee/et/uudised/siem-e-valimiste-turvalisus-riikliku-julgeoleku-kusimus
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimistele-tehakse-it-ministri-juhtimisel-esimene-rahvusvaheline-audit/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimiste-auditi-osas-valitseb-veel-teadmatus/
[2020-11-12] SK ID Solutions AS annual conference was replaced with a video presentation. Among the topics covered: SK team has grown; Smart-ID solution is to be implemented in Iceland; SK has teamed up with TalTech to pre-emptively identify and counter phishing scams.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BBgScfRy0k
[2020-11-08] Minister of the Interior Mart Helme (EKRE) made a statement (without providing any evidence) that election results are falsified in favor of a particular political party by those with access to i-votes. The head of the state electoral service refuted all statements of the minister. The Minister of the Interior later resigned due to other unfounded claims in the context of the U.S. presidential elections.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/siseminister-mart-helme-seadis-eesti-e-valimiste-susteemi-ilma-toendeid-esitamata-kahtluse-alla/
https://news.err.ee/1157305/koppel-electoral-committee-does-not-falsify-election-results-in-estonia
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/varia/riigi-valimisteenistuse-juht-lukkab-umber-koik-mart-helme-vaited?id=91621201
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigi-valimisteenistus-lukkab-kategooriliselt-umber-eksminister-helme-e-valimiste-teemalised-vaited/
[2020-11-01] A cyber defense exercise “Cyber Battle of Tartu” for pupils and students was held at the Delta Center in Tartu. The competition was organized by CybExer Technologies. The participants had to find vulnerabilities in the school’s information system, stop the attack on the hospital’s vital systems and prevent a cyber attack aimed at opening the museum’s treasury.
https://tartu.postimees.ee/7100809/kuberkaitsespetsialist-hans-lougas-internetis-peab-motlema-nagu-hakker
https://tartu.postimees.ee/7099309/tartu-ja-poltsamaa-gumnasistid-esindavad-eestit-rahvusvahelisel-kuberkaitsevoistlusel
[2020-10-29] In the second half of July this year, a new way of banking fraud began to spread – telephone phishing calls. As of the beginning of October, the police has reported 90 cases in which fraudsters have been able to cause damage totaling 200,000 euros. Criminals spoof a bank’s Caller ID, use waiting music, read out the customer’s personal identification code or other personal data, and use all means to create the illusion that the victim is indeed talking to a bank employee. The criminals create fear and state that an action is urgently needed. The victim’s phone receives Mobile-ID or Smart-ID authentication requests and the victim thinks that he is being identified by a bank employee. Scammers are speaking Russian and the victims are mainly the Russian-speaking customers. From the audio recording of the fraudulent call to Swedbank, it is possible to hear that the scammers operate a call center – in the background similar calls can be heard being made to other potential victims. Also the phishing e-mails sent on behalf of banks are once again spreading.
https://tarbija24.postimees.ee/7063755/pank-hoiatab-petukonede-ja-petusonumite-eest
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/sagenenud-venekeelsed-telefonikoned-raha-valja-petmiseks.html
https://www.err.ee/1153036/pangapettuste-ohvriks-langevad-enamasti-venekeelsed-kliendid
https://news.err.ee/1153654/ppa-ria-warn-against-phishing-letters-spread-on-behalf-of-banks
[2020-10-28] Draft regulation specifies requirements for handling interruptions in vital services. The telecommunications operator must ensure that the service is restored within 24 hours if 1000 to 30 000 end users are affected and within 8 hours if more than 200,000 users are affected by the failure.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-paneb-paika-kui-pikad-voivad-olla-elutahtsate-teenuste-katkestused/
[2020-10-26] Cybercriminals stole patient data from a Finnish psychotherapy center. Worries are that the same could happen in Estonia.
https://www.err.ee/1151658/ria-hinnangul-kasutavad-turvalisi-kuberteenuseid-umbes-pooled-perearstid
[2020-10-25] The Ministry of Finance plans to register the loans of residents in a central database.
https://www.err.ee/1151293/riik-kogub-inimeste-kohta-aina-enam-infot
[2020-10-22] A 20-year old man in Tartu had repeatedly ridden a bicycle from the Tartu Bike Share System without authorization by using a friend of a friend’s password. It was only discovered after the bike was ridden for more than an hour in one session resulting in the 1 EUR fee being sent to the account holder. The man was identified using security camera footage. He pleaded guilty and promised to compensate for the damage caused. The police imposed a financial penalty on the man in misdemeanor proceedings.
https://tartu.postimees.ee/7076171/sartsuratas-tegi-supilinlase-nime-all-annelinnas-fantoomsoite
https://tartu.postimees.ee/7091433/politsei-tabas-voora-kontoga-sartsurattaid-laenanud-noormehe
[2020-10-21] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of Interior have made amendments to ban the use of anonymous SIM cards, requiring identification verification for using pre-paid SIM cards. The amendments are needed to help solve drug offenses as well as other organized crime, where anonymous calling cards are often used. The amendments would also affect messaging app services like Skype, WhatsApp and Viber, requiring them to register as communications service providers and require the same degree of ID verification for their users.
https://news.err.ee/1149511/ministry-wants-to-tighten-identification-regulations-on-pre-paid-sim-cards
https://www.err.ee/1149441/mkm-tahaks-turvakaalutlustel-keelata-isikustamata-konekaardid
https://news.err.ee/1149796/legal-expert-anonymous-pre-paid-sim-card-ban-could-violate-privacy-rights
https://news.postimees.ee/7100007/bill-to-obligate-data-collection-and-personalize-prepaid-sim-cards
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/valitsus-toukab-eesti-mitme-pika-sammu-vorra-kontrollimisuhiskonna-poole-likvideeritakse-isikustamata-konekaardid-ja-suhtlusprogrammid-lahevad-voimu-k?id=91396045
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/varia/eksperdid-valitsus-plaanib-olulist-sekkumist-eestlaste-internetivabadusse?id=91408841
[2020-10-16] Estonia holds the second place in the world in terms of internet freedom after Iceland. Estonia did not receive all the points because, among other things, the Tax and Customs Board can oblige Estonian service providers to block illegal gambling sites.
https://novaator.err.ee/1147918/raport-koroonapandeemia-kiirendab-internetivabaduse-vahenemist
https://news.err.ee/1147145/estonia-ranks-second-in-global-internet-freedom-index
https://mkm.ee/et/uudised/eesti-internetivabaduse-poolest-maailmas-esirinnas
[2020-10-16] A recent audit conducted by the Data Protection Inspectorate (AKI) finds that local municipality governments often unjustifiably mark documents as “information intended for internal use”. Most commonly the wage of employees and their vacation information is hidden. There are rumors that when signing an agreement, some personal information is included on purpose so that access restrictions could be applied. At the same time, there are plenty documents available to the public, containing the full names and contacts of private persons. Sometimes personal data leaks by including personal data in the public title of a non-public document.
https://news.err.ee/1147941/data-protection-inspectorate-local-governments-cover-for-officials
[2020-10-09] The Mobile-ID service was disrupted from 11:20 to 14:30.
https://news.err.ee/1145136/mobile-id-experiencing-disruptions-friday
[2020-10-06] The Ministry of Justice has made amendments to prevent mass-download of personal data from the public databases of court decisions and court calendars. Already on 2020-05-08, before the amendments were passed, a robot trap unexpectedly appeared on the website of Rigi Teataja without a legal basis. Previously, journalists had mass-processed the data to inform the public about the candidates of Riigikogu and municipality elections that have been criminally sentenced.
https://news.err.ee/1143685/law-change-to-stop-personal-legal-information-remaining-open-data
https://news.err.ee/1116586/reduced-accessibility-of-open-data-would-complicate-courts-work
https://news.err.ee/1115164/ministry-of-justice-wants-to-reduce-accessibility-of-court-data
[2020-10-01] CERT.LV organized the online conference “Cybershock 2020”. Among the participants were Estonians Jaanus Kääp (Clarified Security) and Hans Lõugas (CybExer Technologies).
https://cert.lv/lv/2020/09/technical-online-conference-cybershock-2020
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JuzAsFakHec
[2020-09-30] The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications has finished a regulation bill which will restrict the use of non-EU telecoms tech in Estonia, including those from Huawei. Initially, these requirements will affect the providers of vital services such as the communication companies, which have at least 10,000 clients – Telia, Elisa, Tele2, Levikom and STV. Huawei says it will challenge the bill. Elisa CEO claims that there is no real risk from Chinese tech and that the ban on Huawei’s equipment will cost Elisa tens of millions of euros.
https://news.err.ee/1117620/elisa-ceo-hits-out-at-ministry-huawei-tech-ban-draft
https://www.mkm.ee/et/uudised/mkm-alustas-sidevorkude-turvalisuse-maaruse-eelnou-avalikku-konsultatsiooni
https://www.err.ee/1142482/uus-sidevorkude-turvakontroll-hakkab-hindama-tootjaid
https://news.err.ee/1143507/huawei-plans-to-challenge-estonia-5g-ban-in-court
https://news.err.ee/1147922/huawei-asks-government-to-review-communications-networks-regulation
https://news.err.ee/1146282/estonia-to-limit-officials-choice-of-network-devices-and-software
https://www.err.ee/1161191/elisa-juht-riigi-analuusi-jargi-maarab-vorguseadmete-valjavahetamise-kulud-kohus
[2020-09-29] Three Romanian nationals were arrested in Romania for being suspected of organizing the Mobile-ID and Smart-ID phishing attacks that started in 2019. The aggregate sum stolen from close to 40 victims totals over €100,000. Estonian police detectives took part in the operation that was carried out in Bucharest. The prosecutor’s office is applying for the suspects to be extradited to Estonia for court proceedings.
https://news.err.ee/1140977/police-apprehend-suspects-in-cyberattacks-against-estonia
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/7073958/rumeenias-peeti-kinni-eesti-vastastes-kuberrunnakutes-kahtlustatavad
[2020-09-29] The procurement of a new Mobile ID solution is in process. An offer was received from two companies: the first applicant is the current partner SK ID Solutions that wants to continue providing the service, but the second applicant is the Belgian company Belgian Mobile ID, which was set up in 2016 by seven mobile operators and banks. The procurement doesn’t constrain technology too much and assesses the proposals individually. The solution must allow the change of crypto algorithms without going to a service office (i.e., remotely). For the enrollment it can support face-to-face identification, digital identification and biometric identification. Suspension of the certificates must not be supported.
https://riigihanked.riik.ee/rhr-web/#/procurement/2063672/general-info
https://riigihanked.riik.ee/rhr-web/#/procurement/2063672/applications
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1297196116358897665
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/belgia-ettevote-tahab-eestile-pakkuda-uut-mobiil-idd?id=91411201
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/id-kaart-ja-mobiil-id-vajavad-uuenduskuuri?id=89736991
[2020-09-25] A research article by Mihkel Solvak (UT): “Does vote verification work: usage and impact of confidence building technology in Internet voting”. The study finds that: i-vote verifiers are younger males and Linux users with the verification rate especially high in the 18 to 40 age group; voting from abroad clearly leads to more verification; the cast-as-intended verification leads to higher confidence that ones vote was taken into account.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-60347-2_14
[2020-09-18] From August, RIA started monitoring procedures for the implementation of information security measures for all critical databases in Estonia. A total of ten critical databases have been defined: e-file (e-toimik), land register, commercial register, Riigi Teataja information system, land cadastre, state treasury information system, taxpayer register, population register, register of identity documents and state pension insurance register.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-august-2020.html
[2020-09-17] The investigative journalism show “Pealtnägija” investigated a scam of fictitious real estate ads targeted at foreign students. While the victims believed that they were transferring money as a deposit for an apartment, they effectively paid an Estonian Bitcoin trader for the scammer’s purchase of bitcoins.
https://news.err.ee/1136558/pealtnagija-foreign-students-falling-victim-to-fictitious-real-estate-ads
[2020-09-17] Government will revoke 10 citizenships acquired illegally as the result of a widespread fraud that was committed during the years of 2013-2015 by a criminal group involving PPA employees. Previously, Estonian citizenship has only been revoked once by a government decision in 2016.
https://news.err.ee/1136097/government-to-revoke-10-citizenships-acquired-illegally
[2020-09-16] A research article by Sven Heiberg (SCCEIV), Kristjan Krips (Cybernetica/UT) and Jan Willemson (Cybernetica/STACC): “Planning the next steps for Estonian Internet voting”. The authors mostly reiterate the discussion points in the report of feasibility of i-voting on smart devices.
https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/planning.pdf
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/en/Download/38e36fd7-1428-42a1-ac6b-30d561bf849c
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1306178995747250179
[2020-09-06] A research article by Valentyna Tsap (TalTech), Silvia Lips (TalTech) and Dirk Draheim (TalTech): “Analyzing eID Public Acceptance and User Preferences for Current Authentication Options in Estonia”. The study finds that the ID card is used the most to access e-services; Smart ID holds the second position; username/password and Mobile-ID shares the third choice.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-58957-8_12
[2020-09-01] Kaija Kirch, previously a document expert at the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PPA), now works for Cybernetica.
[2020-08-28] After two years, the court has not yet started to resolve the case of PPA vs Gemalto. In August 2019, a preliminary hearing was held where the possibility of finding a compromise was discussed. However, as of 2020-08-28 no compromise has been reached and both parties have submitted a number of different requests that the court has to resolve.
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/tehnika/politsei-vs-gemalto-kaks-aastat-kohtuveskeid-ja-ei-tuhjagi?id=90871257
[2020-08-25] CERT-EE identified almost twenty websites that did not check the certificate revocation information when authenticating users with an ID card. In two cases, there was also no check on whether the certificate was signed by SK ID Solutions. This effectively allowed ID card authentication bypass in these services.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-juuli-2020.html
https://jarvateataja.postimees.ee/7046443/mitmed-eesti-veebilehed-ei-kontrollinud-autentimisel-sertifikaatide-kehtivust
[2020-08-25] BSc thesis by Sander-Karl Kivivare (UT): “Secure Channel Establishment for the NFC Interface of the New Generation Estonian ID Cards”. The thesis describes the cryptographic protocol that is used to communicate with the Estonian ID card over the contactless interface and provides detailed instructions with code examples in Python, to help software developers create applications that can make use of the new NFC interface introduced in the ID cards issued since December 2018.
https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=70557&year=2020&language=en
https://github.com/Kivivares/estid-nfc
[2020-08-25] BSc thesis by Jekaterina Gorohhova (UT): “Malicious Android app for security testing”. In the context of this thesis, an Android app was developed to demonstrate how a malicious app with a given set of Android permissions can abuse them to collect personal data stored on a user’s device and then send it out.
https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=70525&year=2020&language=en
[2020-08-21] RIA has banned the social media app TikTok on all phones belonging to RIA employees and has also recommended the ban to other state institutions. The app is considered a security threat as it is collecting far more information about its users than necessary.
https://news.err.ee/1126180/information-system-authority-in-essence-tiktok-a-security-threat
[2020-08-20] July statistics from the state authentication service TARA show that Smart-ID became the most popular identification tool outperforming the ID card. The number of government agencies using TARA in their e-services is currently between 30-40, but RIA expects it to grow to over a hundred. RIA plans to remove the banklink authentication option from TARA at the end of 2020, as the banks are accessed by the same ID card, Mobile-ID and Smart-ID that are directly supported by TARA as well.
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/smart-id-tousis-koige-populaarsemaks-tuvastusvahendiks-eesti-riigi-e-teenustes?id=90789775
[2020-08-20] Estonia launched the coronavirus exposure notification app “HOIA” (Keep). The app was created in cooperation with 12 Estonian companies – Cybernetica, Fujitsu Estonia, Guardtime, Icefire, Iglu, Mobi Lab, Mooncascade, Velvet, FOB Solutions, Heisi IT OÜ, Bytelogics and ASA Quality Services OÜ. The development was done at the companies’ own expense. The state only paid for an independent security audit that cost 30,000 EUR. The Data Protection Inspectorate and Chancellor of Justice deems the app suitable as the privacy of its users is protected. RIA also recommends using the app, but notes that the requirement for bluetooth to be constantly on creates additional risks.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/aki-peab-eestlaste-koroonaappi-sobilikuks-oiguskantsleri-buroo-jagab-tunnustust/
https://news.err.ee/1125119/feature-estonia-launches-coronavirus-exposure-notification-app-hoia
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/eesti-koroonaapp-maksis-30-000-eurot?id=90849441
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/trendid-ja-tahelepanekud-kuberruumis-iii-kvartal-2020.html
[2020-08-14] Research article by Arnis Parsovs (UT): “Estonian Electronic Identity Card: Security Flaws in Key Management”. The article, among other things, provides details about the malpractice of the Estonian ID card manufacturer Gemalto in generating private keys outside the ID card.
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/parsovs
[2020-08-13] Tartu County Court convicted Dennis Einasto of computer fraud that caused nearly €28,500 in damages, of illegally obtaining access to computer systems and of large-scale money laundering. Overall, he was sentenced to 4.5 years in jail. Einasto’s computer contained cryptocurrency and web hosting databases hosting large numbers of usernames and passwords, but which did not belong to him. The cyber crimes were committed on an international scale.
https://news.err.ee/1123315/tartu-county-court-convicts-man-of-cyber-crime-money-laundering
[2020-08-05] The passwords and e-mail addresses of 27,000 users of an unnamed Estonian advertising portal was leaked. The data was accessible for almost a year without the portal being aware of it. The portal has informed users about the leak and the same account data can no longer be used to enter the environment. Although the portal did not inform the Personal Data Inspectorate (AKI) in time, AKI has not yet made a decision on whether supervision proceedings should be initiated.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/27-000-eestlase-paroolid-lekkisid-portaal-kuulis-lekkest-aasta-parast-selle-toimumist/
[2020-07-28] Due to a human error, the Ministry of Justice made a report in their document register public that contaied personal data of approximately 1000 people who sought legal advice. The information listed names and the reason the person had obtained legal aid. The Ministry of Justice has not informed the affected persons about the leak as this would have meant further processing of the data, which was intended to be avoided. According to the ministry, the article published by the media is enough.
https://www.err.ee/1117570/justiitsministeerium-jattis-avalikuks-oigusabi-saanud-inimeste-andmed
https://news.err.ee/1117589/justice-ministry-glitch-leaks-legal-aid-personal-data-online
https://news.err.ee/1129734/ministry-of-justice-has-not-informed-people-of-data-breach
[2020-07-27] BSc thesis by Silver Maala (UT): “A Proof of Concept Malware for Interacting with the Smart-ID Android Application”. The thesis presents a proof-of-concept Android malware that can take over the Smart-ID app running on a rooted Android device.
https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=69678&year=2020
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/loputoo-pahavaraga-saab-varastada-smart-id-pin-koode-ja-neid-automaatselt-sisestada/
[2020-07-23] The National Audit Office has published the audit report “Effectiveness of the e-Residency programme”. The report finds that foreigners with a criminal background and/or business ban have become e-Residents, as PPA does not have the capability to perform sufficient background checking for foreigners. Another noteworthy finding is that only 10% of e-Residents have renewed their digital IDs after expiration.
https://news.err.ee/1117934/audit-criminals-have-become-e-residents-better-background-checks-needed
https://www.err.ee/1117824/riigikontroll-kriminaalid-saavad-liialt-lihtsalt-eesti-e-residendiks
https://www.err.ee/1118255/ott-vatter-kahtlase-paritoluga-e-residentide-suhtarv-on-vaga-vaike
https://mkm.ee/et/uudised/valiskaubandus-ja-it-minister-varske-audit-selge-kinnitus-e-residentsuse-programmi
https://www.err.ee/1118243/ministeerium-eesti-teeb-koik-et-e-residentsust-ei-saaks-ohtu-kujutavad-valismaalased
[2020-07-23] The Ministry of the Interior proposed a bill that would give law enforcement organizations backdoor access to encrypted messaging applications. The idea faced sharp criticism and later the Ministry of Justice rejected the proposal due to the lack of a thorough analysis of the consequences.
https://news.err.ee/1116325/interior-ministry-looking-for-backdoor-into-encrypted-messaging-apps
https://www.err.ee/1115645/siseministeerium-soovib-krupteeritud-sonumirakendustesse-tagaust
https://www.err.ee/1116295/kuberoiguse-ekspert-tagauste-lubamine-muudaks-eesti-digiriigi-aluseid
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/vandeadvokaat-turk-tagaust-toetavad-inimesed-ei-saa-tegelikult-aru-mida-nad-soovivad/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-e-riigi-endine-peaarhitekt-tehniliselt-ei-ole-voimalik-tagada-et-tagauksest-tulevad-sisse-ainult-oilsad/
https://www.err.ee/1116665/peeter-p-motskula-tagauksega-kruptoside-rumal-ja-oigusvastane-idee
https://www.err.ee/1116669/rainer-ratnik-neli-pohjust-miks-tagaukse-lubamine-pole-moistlik
https://www.err.ee/1127157/kaimar-karu-kuberturbeteatri-kordusetendus
https://www.err.ee/1149441/mkm-tahaks-turvakaalutlustel-keelata-isikustamata-konekaardid
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1295653952554438656
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1329455387683250179
[2020-07-21] The government has made amendments to the “Statutes of the Health Information System” allowing the authentication of subjects using “ID card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID or other equivalent device”. Historically, access to the Health Information System has only been granted based on authentication using the ID card. The security requirements have likely been relaxed due to the pressing coronavirus situation.
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/118072020004
[2020-07-21] Kert Kingo (EKRE), a member of the Riigikogu’s Legal Affairs Committee, explained why EKRE is so worried about i-voting. According to her, the distrust is created by the fact that it is possible to give an i-vote using another person’s ID card and that i-voting data is destroyed immediately after the elections.
https://uueduudised.ee/uudis/eesti/miks-erke-e-valimiste-parast-nii-palju-muretseb-kert-kingo-sest-need-tekitavad-usaldamatust/
[2020-07-10] Research article by Kaido Kikkas (TalTech) and Birgy Lorenz (TalTech): “Training Young Cybersecurity Talents – The Case of Estonia”. The paper describes the Estonian experience with the CyberOlympics/CyberSpike program from 2017–2019 and reflects on the lessons learned about talent building in cybersecurity.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-50729-9_36
[2020-07-07] Research article by Laura Kask (UT/Proud Engineers) and Kristiina Laanest (RIA): “Determining the Time of Electronic Signing: Legal Requirements and Technological Possibilities”. The authors suggest establishing the time from the timestamp as the time of signing, but fail to address the issues raised in the original article “Time of signing in the Estonian digital signature scheme” by T.Mets and A.Parsovs.
https://www.juridica.ee/article.php?uri=2020_4_elektroonilise_allkirjastamise_aja_tuvastamine_iguslikud_n_uded_ja_tehnilised_v_imalused
https://www.id.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/j_20_4_294.pdf
https://cybersec.ee/timesign/
[2019-12-19] A research paper by Abasi-amefon Affia (UT): “Assessing the NFC Unlock Mechanism of the Tartu Smart Bike Share System”. The paper describes a flaw in the Tartu Smart Bike Share System that can be exploited to create a clone of a victim’s Tartu bus card, which can then be used to unlock the bikes. To create the clone, only the card number printed on the victim’s Tartu bus card is needed (valid numbers can be guessed). The flaw has now been partially mitigated as cloning is still possible, but the task is not that trivial.
https://kodu.ut.ee/~arnis/bikeshare_nfc.pdf

Cyber Security master’s theses defense in TalTech/UT (August 2020)

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Defences of master theses of Cyber Security curriculum on August 17th 2020. The defences will take place online.

Time: 9:30
Student: Tarmo Oja
Title: X-ROAD TRUST MODEL AND TECHNOLOGY THREAT ANALYSIS
Supervisor: Ahto Buldas, Mari Seeba
Reviewer: Aleksandr Lenin

Time: 10:10
Student: Nikita Snetkov
Title: PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTABILITY OF TWO-PARTY ECDSA SIGNATURE SCHEMES
Supervisor: Ahto Buldas
Reviewer: Aleksandr Lenin

Time: 10:50
Student: Liubomyr Kushnir
Title: BENCHMARKING OF POST-HOC LOCAL INTERPRETABILITY METHODS FOR CLASSIFYING MALICIOUS TRAFFIC
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi, Sven Nõmm
Reviewer: Pavel Tšikul

Time: 12:00
Student: Timm Jeff E Luyten
Title: RAISING CYBER AWARENESS WITH NON-IT PROFESSIONALS WORKING IN A HOME OFFICE ENVIRONMENT USING A PILOT VIDEO GAME CONCEPT
Supervisor: Birgy Lorenz
Reviewer: Sten Mäses

Time: 12:40
Student: Andrew J Roberts
Title: Development of a cybersecurity evaluation test bed for autonomous self-driving vehicles
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Tobias Eggendorfer

Time: 13:20
Student: Ilkin Huseynov
Title: THE ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT CYBER SECURITY ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE E-GOVERNMENT OF AZERBAIJAN AND PROPOSAL OF THE IMPROVEMENT PLAN
Supervisor: Mika Kerttunen
Reviewer: Adrian Venables

Time: 14:15
Student: Andres Pihlak
Title: CONTINUOUS DOCKER IMAGE ANALYSIS AND INTRUSION DETECTION BASED ON OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS
Supervisor: Mauno Pihelgas
Reviewer: Kristian Kivimägi

Time: 14:55
Student: Eduard Iltšuk
Title: Two-Party ECDSA Protocol for Smart-ID
Supervisor: Arnis Paršovs
Reviewer: Jan Villemson

Time: 15:35
Student: Aivo Toots
Title: Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Business Processes
Supervisor: Peeter Laud
Reviewer: Marlon Dumas, Janno Siim

Cyber Security Newsletter 2020-07-16

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[2020-07-15] MKM is studying the possibility to notify citizens via alternative channels such as WhatsApp and Facebook.
https://news.err.ee/1113020/government-seeking-to-create-communication-system-through-mobile-phone-apps
[2020-07-02] The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized an open master class on cyber diplomacy with experts from around the world. Video recording is available on Youtube.
https://vm.ee/et/virtuaalne-kuberdiplomaatia-meistriklass-2020
[2020-07-01] SK intermediate CA certificates have been issued with the “OCSP sign” extension which means that revoking these intermediate CA certificates in the event the key gets compromised will be problematic. According to CA/B Baseline Requirements these certificates have been misissued and SK should revoke them. SK has responded that it does not plan to revoke the certificates and is ready to leave Mozilla CA program earlier than planned (the last 4 still valid TLS server certificates issued by SK will expire by September 29, 2020).
https://www.mail-archive.com/dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org/msg13607.html
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1649942
[2020-07-01] The work of Smart-ID and Mobile-ID was disrupted for about ten minutes.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/mobiil-id-ja-smart-id-kasutamine-on-hairitud/
[2020-06-30] The state has stalled plans to include information from all guests who stay in accommodation establishments in Estonia in a single police database.
https://news.err.ee/1107522/state-pauses-plans-for-hotel-guests-e-database
[2020-06-29] The Interdisciplinary Cyber Research (ICR) conference 2020 has been rescheduled to December. The Cyber Security Summer School has been renamed to Cyber Security Winter School and moved to December. The theme for the winter school will be “Transport as a Service”.
https://old.taltech.ee/institutes/centre-for-digital-forensics-cyber-security/events-19/interdisciplinary-cyber-research-icr-workshop/
http://www.studyitin.ee/c3s2020
[2020-06-29] In the period of COVID emergency, Elisa for more than 1,700 people provided a solution for automated Mobile-ID issuance using a self-service portal. The solution was accepted by SK and their auditors.
https://www.ria.ee/et/ris-infokiri-juuni-2020.html
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/tehisintellekt-aitas-eriolukorra-ajal-vormistada-mobiil-id-rohkem-kui-1700-inimesele?id=90685697
[2020-06-27] The 50 EUR limit on contactless card payments put in place during the coronavirus emergency situation will remain in place.
https://news.err.ee/1106688/50-contactless-card-payment-limit-to-remain-in-place
https://news.err.ee/1068231/contactless-payment-limit-increased-to-50-to-limit-spread-of-coronavirus
https://raha.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/pangad-kahekordistavad-kriisi-ajaks-viipemakse-limiidi-et-inimesed-ei-peaks-pin-klaviatuuri-nappima/
[2020-06-22] In May fraudsters persuaded a victim to create a Smart-ID account over the phone. The created Smart-ID account was used by fraudsters to purchase services from several financial service providers.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/eesti-arvutikasutajad-olid-ka-mais-ongitsuskampaaniate-hambus.html
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-mai-2020.html
[2020-06-17] Research article by Valentyna Tsap (TalTech), Silvia Lips (TalTech) and Dirk Draheim (TalTech): “eID Public Acceptance in Estonia: towards Understanding the Citizen”. The researchers conducted a survey among Estonian eID users to find out which of the existing eID authentication options are preferred and why.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3396956.3397009
[2020-06-04] The use of eID increased in the period of COVID emergency. As of May, 35 institutions with as many as 114 different applications had joined the state authentication service.
https://blog.ria.ee/e-riik-eriolukorras/
[2020-06-09] Lithuanian Cyber Security Center found 61 vulnerabilities in Chinese security cameras Hikvision and Dahua used by PPA. According to PPA, the cameras are not available on the public network and PPA has verified that the cameras do not communicate with servers that are not located in NATO or EU member states.
https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/leedu-kuberturvalisuse-keskus-leidis-hulgaliselt-turvanorkusi-kaameratest-mida-kasutab-laialdaselt-eesti-politsei/
https://www.nksc.lt/doc/biuleteniai/2020-05-27%20Hikvision%20ir%20Dahua%20kameru%20kibernetinio%20saugumo%20vertinimas.pdf
[2020-06-02] Thanks to IT Academy funding, TalTech has established the “Centre for Hardware Security” led by professor Samuel Pagliarini. The main research directions include the design of reliable microelectronics, measures to prevent reverse engineering, side-channel attacks, the deployment of cryptographic hardware, secure system design tools, and hardware Trojans and backdoors. The long term goal is to build all the right competences to put Estonia “on the map” of Hardware Security and IC design in general.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/teadus-ja-tulevik/taltechi-riistvara-turvalisusega-tegelev-uurimisgrupp-aitab-valtida-tuleviku-id-kaardi-kriise/
https://old.taltech.ee/ttu-uudised/uudised/mente-et-manu-5/varske-veri-samuel-nascimento-pagliarini/?id=196261&year=2019
[2020-06-01] Research article by Arnis Parsovs (UT): “Solving the Estonian ID Card Crisis: the Legal Issues”. The study analyzes to what extent, while solving the 2017 ID card crisis, the involved parties were able to precisely follow the applicable laws and regulations in the field.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3644664
[2020-05-28] Ahto Truu (TalTech) defended his PhD thesis “Hash-Based Server-Assisted Digital Signature Solutions” and gave an interview in Geenius about universal digital signing and its dangers.
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/en/Item/a972cc4b-53ec-4c82-8de0-b3e941cce345
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/teadus-ja-tulevik/taltechi-doktor-millal-jouame-universaalse-digiallkirjastamiseni-ja-mis-ohud-seda-varitsevad/
[2020-05-28] RIA provided an explanation for why they recommended that the National Electoral Committee not enable Smart-ID for i-voting in the 2021 elections. To summarize: (1) Smart-ID has been used in successful attacks; (2) Smart-ID is not a state provided eID solution – if allowing i-voting with Smart-ID, there is no reason to not enable i-voting with other private eID solutions; (3) not enough experience to say if Smart-ID biometrical enrollment is secure enough; (4) the state does not have enough control over Smart-ID to intervene in case of emergency;
https://blog.ria.ee/smart-id-ja-valimised/
[2020-05-20] The Estonian National Electoral Committee has reviewed 25 suggestions from the i-voting working group and has provided their decision on each suggestion. The most important decisions included not enabling i-voting with Smart-ID and i-voting with a mobile app for the 2021 elections.
https://www.riigikogu.ee/download/8eb9f7ff-8838-4cc8-a52a-ee9f481dd89e
https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1266014478388396032
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/mobiiliga-haaletamist-jargmistel-valimistel-ei-tule/
[2020-05-27] SK had a scheduled maintenance on May 28 and 29 due to which the use of ID card, Mobile-ID and Smart-ID was affected.
https://news.err.ee/1095129/id-cards-mobile-id-and-smart-id-to-be-interrupted-during-maintenance
[2020-05-27] The Estonian Students Society organized a public discussion about cyber security. Participants in the discussion: Siim Alatalu (Head of EU CyberNet), Märt Hiietamm (Head of RIA Analysis and Prevention Department), Uku Särekanno (European Union IT Agency), Ragnar Õun (Head of RIA Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Department) and Ilmar Üle (CERT-EU).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qpr3IQCRSp8
[2020-05-26] Dan Bogdanov (Cybernetica) in an interview explains the privacy principles behind the Estonian coronavirus app.
https://news.postimees.ee/6981981/is-tech-giants-coronavirus-app-technology-safe
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/aki-peadirektor-pille-lehis-mulle-teeb-muret-euroopa-trend-ja-soov-koroonaappe-arendada/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eestis-on-nuud-esimene-koroona-kontaktijalgimise-app-aga-sa-ei-peaks-seda-kasutama/
[2020-05-26] Research article by Anne Veerpalu (UT), Liisi Jürgen (UT), Eduardo da Cruz Rodrigues e Silva (TalTech) and Alex Norta (TalTech): “The hybrid smart contract agreement challenge to European electronic signature regulation”, assesses whether the signature on a smart contract used in an ICO process is functionally equivalent to the qualified electronic signature under eIDAS.
https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eaaa005/5846238
[2020-05-25] A research article by Mart Oruaas (Cybernetica) and Jan Willemson (Cybernetica/STACC): “Developing requirements for the new encryption mechanisms in the Estonian eID infrastructure”.
https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/NewEstCDOC.pdf
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-57672-1_2
[2020-05-21] Sorainen’s partner, lawyer Kaupo Lepasepp, writes that the digital signature is essentially unforgeable.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/advokaat-e-allkiri-on-sisuliselt-voltsimatu-aga-tahvelarvuti-ekraanile-tehtud-kritselduse-seostamiseks-kindla-isikuga-ei-ole-selget-viisi/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bV-HwuhGKO8
[2020-05-20] RIA has compiled a comprehensive overview of cyber security in Estonia titled “Cyber Security in Estonia 2020”. The compilation mostly consists of excerpts from annual reports of different public sector organizations.
https://www.ria.ee/en/news/cyber-security-estonia-2020-comprehensive-look-estonian-cyber-landscape.html
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/RIA/cyber_security_in_estonia_2020_0.pdf
[2020-05-20] UT student Siim-Alexander Kütt in his BSc research found a flaw in the Tartu Bike Share system which allowed anyone to query the location of any bike and the user ID of the person riding the bike. Turns out that Tartu City previously paid 12 960 EUR to Estonian company SecTeam for a black-box security audit of the system.
https://ee.linkedin.com/in/arvo-saalits took a credit for discovring the previous leak in July 2019.
https://epl.delfi.ee/uudised/tudeng-leidis-tartu-rattaringluse-apist-jarjekordsed-turvavead?id=89909901
https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=69774&year=2020
[2020-05-18] The Data Protection Inspectorate released its yearbook describing in more detail the data leak in Tartu Bike Share system discovered in July 2019. Arvo Saalits in his Linkedin profile has taken the credit for the discovery of the flaw.
https://aastaraamat.aki.ee/sites/default/files/inline-files/AKI%20aastaraamat%202019.pdf
https://aastaraamat.aki.ee/aastaraamat-2019-aastast-peadirektori-pilgu-labi/rikkumine-ei-toonudki-suurt-trahvi
https://ee.linkedin.com/in/arvo-saalits
[2020-05-19] LHV bank accidentally leaked names of 200 LHV customers by sending a mass email with the recipients in the CC field. According to the Data Protection Inspectorate, the data controller must notify the Inspectorate of a personal data breach within 72 hours of the incident, but whether it is a breach or not, the bank must assess it itself.
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/varia/suur-eksitus-lhv-lekitas-kogemata-sadade-laenusaajate-nimed?id=89906591
[2020-05-14] From May 14 to 16 a Smart-ID phishing campaign was run imitating SEB bank page.
https://kasulik.delfi.ee/news/uudised/seb-panga-nimel-levib-taas-ohtlik-ongitsuskiri-mida-ei-tohiks-mingil-juhul-avada?id=89862581
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-mai-2020.html
[2020-05-14] MKM plans to hire an official who will focus on the i-voting risks. In order to apply, the applicants had to write an essay on the topic “Problems of risk management related to e-elections”. Five people applied but the results are not yet known.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/endise-ministri-otsusel-palkab-riik-e-valimiste-riskidele-keskenduva-ametniku/
https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/kuberriskide_nounik.pdf
[2020-05-12] KAPO released their annual review describing a flaw in the free email provider’s mail.ee website (opening an email triggers XSS). By opening a specially crafted email, mail.ee user account was automatically configured to enable an email redirect to the attacker’s email address. The flaw was exploited against a small number of mail.ee users who were of interest to a foreign country. Another attack described in the review is a phishing email used to try to gain access to some email accounts of the University of Tartu. According to KAPO, the attack was organized at the instructions of the government of Iran.
https://kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202019.pdf
https://news.err.ee/1076983/russian-youth-engagement-migration-china-flagged-in-kapo-s-2019-yearbook
https://news.postimees.ee/6950229/iss-iran-intelligence-attempted-to-access-university-of-tartu-e-mail-accounts
https://www.postimees.ee/6949265/iraani-luure-uritas-ligipaasu-tartu-ulikooli-e-posti-kontodele
https://twitter.com/SadEstonianIT/status/1256610514614050816
https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/102471/hacking/estonian-provider-mail-ee-hacked.html
[2020-05-12] Riigikogu amended the Electronic Communications Act providing that in order to ensure national security, the government may, by a regulation, impose an obligation on a communications undertaking to notify the hardware and software used in the communications network and to apply for a permit to use the hardware and software of the communications network. These amendments are most likely targeted to exclude Huawei from 5G deployment.
https://www.riigikogu.ee/istungi-ulevaated/riigikogu-muutis-elektroonilise-side-seadust/
[2020-05-07] RIA’s new yearbook provides a good overview of the current and upcoming work of RIA – the state network, DigiDoc4 software, e-voting, critical information infrastructure protection and CERT-EE activities. Some highlights:
– Starting from July 2021, the ID card chip will contain the cardholder’s picture and fingerprints in addition to their personal data file.
– RIA is considering enabling a single sign-on service (SSO) to be used for the state authentication service.
– RIA is introducing a consent service to allow citizens to share their health and other data with service providers (e.g., health insurers).
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/varske-aastaraamat-tutvustab-ria-tood-ja-2019-aasta-sundmusi-eesti-kuberruumis.html
https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/ria_aastaraamat_2020_48lk_eng.pdf
https://github.com/e-gov/NT/
[2020-05-06] TalTech and Estonian Maritime Academy received 2.5 million euro funding to establish a maritime cyber security center. The five-year project plans to supplement the existing master’s and doctoral study programs, organize trainings and conferences.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/teadus-ja-tulevik/taltech-eesti-mereakadeemia-ja-it-teaduskond-loovad-merenduse-kuberturbe-keskuse/
https://old.taltech.ee/institutes/centre-for-digital-forensics-cyber-security/&id=200834
https://vikerraadio.err.ee/1084657/uudis-lauri-varik/1049735
[2020-04-22] Cybernetica released the report “Mobile voting feasibility study and risk analysis”, which found that introducing a mobile i-voting application has its risks but is possible. The National Electoral Committee, however, in their 2020-05-20 meeting decided not to introduce it in the 2021 elections.
https://www.valimised.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/eng/2020_m-voting-report.pdf
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/analuus-nutiseadmega-e-haaletamine-teostatav.html
https://news.err.ee/1082021/ria-mobile-voting-could-be-launched-in-2021
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigi-tellitud-analuus-leiab-et-telefoniga-e-haaletamine-on-voimalik/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ria-loodetavasti-saab-mobiiliga-haaletada-juba-jargmistel-valimistel/
[2020-04-21] EKRE has formed a committee in riigikogu with the aim to make i-voting transparent. Former minister of IT and foreign trade Kert Kingo is chairman of the committee.
https://news.err.ee/1080422/ekre-forms-e-voting-transparency-committee-in-riigikogu
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/04/21/ekre-loi-riigikogus-e-haaletamise-labipaistvaks-muutmise-toetusruhma-kuhu-kuulub-terve-fraktsioon
[2020-04-18] According to RIA, in April 18 denial-of-service attacks sharing a similar handwriting were executed against the e-services eesti.ee, id.ee, emta.ee, elron.ee and elisa.ee. RIA was also notified about DoS attacks against eKool.eu and SK ID Solutions. On April 22, the availability of Luminor’s bank website was disrupted as a result of a DDoS attack on a Lithuanian service provider.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-aprill-2020.html
[2020-04-17] RIA has made its internal chat and file sharing platform publicly available. The services were built using open source solutions Rocket.Chat and Nextcloud. The solutions have been pentested by the order of RIA. A Twitter user noticed that the chat service has a public list of its users with their last names, birth dates and personal ID codes.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ria-annab-aru-kui-palju-laksid-riiklikud-suhtlus-ja-failivahetuskeskkonnad-maksumaksjale-maksma/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tana-avati-riiklikud-veebisuhtluse-ja-failivahetuse-keskkonnad/
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/tarkvara/ria-avas-testiks-turvalised-veebisuhtluse-ja-failivahetuse-keskkonnad?id=89427961
https://twitter.com/SadEstonianIT/status/1246168005396115456
[2020-04-15] A UT professor obtained information from UT about the student who left negative feedback about the professor in the anonymous study information system (OIS) feedback form.
https://news.err.ee/1077745/university-of-tartu-professor-demanding-2-000-from-alum-over-word-usage
[2020-04-15] The pensioner who organized document forgery in PPA was sentenced to long-term imprisonment.
https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/dokumendivoltsijate-jouku-vedanud-pensionar-moisteti-aastateks-trellide-taha?id=89563595
https://www.err.ee/1077522/kohus-moistis-mahuka-passiari-korraldaja-pikaks-ajaks-vangi
https://cybersec.ee/2017/02/02/document-counterfeiting-case-maarika-comes-to-court/
[2020-04-15] The use of Smart-ID was disrupted between 11:18 and 23:00. The error was caused by a problem with the database.
https://www.postimees.ee/6950878/smart-id-too-oli-kolmapaeval-hairitud
[2020-04-13] The Cyber Defense Unit of the Defense League provided support for the Health Board by processing and visualizing COVID data using various data sources.
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/04/13/kaitsevae-kubervaejuhatus-aitab-terviseametil-luua-uut-infosusteemi
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/tehnika/kubervagi-tegi-terviseametile-olulise-infosusteemi?id=89876695
[2020-04-06] According to RIA a fraud scheme is becoming popular, where criminals send a convincing e-mail to HR managers in the name of the employee requesting their salary to be transfered to a new bank account from the coming month.
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/04/06/ria-hoiatus-levimas-on-palgakonto-pettused
[2020-03-26] Podcast with Marko Belzetski (Clarified Security) discussing Android and web application penetration testing.
https://testguild.com/podcast/security/s14-marko/
[2020-03-24] The state has analyzed the spread of the coronavirus by analyzing mobile phone location data. This raised privacy concerns and the Chanchellor of Justice examined the constitutionality of the use of data. Aggregate data was prepared by mobile operators and sent to Statistics Estonia. Google used its data to provide similar mobility analysis.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/mobiilidelt-kogutud-asukohaandmed-naitavad-et-eestlased-on-eriolukorra-ajal-jaanud-paiksemaks/
https://news.err.ee/1068209/statistics-estonia-to-study-people-s-movements-during-emergency-situation
https://news.err.ee/1069467/mobility-analysis-planned-by-statistics-estonia-not-to-use-real-time-data
https://news.err.ee/1069764/mobility-analysis-to-be-finalized-next-week
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/oiguskantsler-uurib-mobiiltelefonidelt-kogutud-andmete-statistilise-kasutamise-kooskola-pohiseadusega/
https://www.err.ee/1071113/mobiilioperaator-liikumismustrite-jalgimine-ei-tugine-gps-i-andmetel
https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility/
https://news.err.ee/1073762/opinion-why-is-government-pursuing-extensive-surveillance-law-in-crisis
[2020-03-23] Research article by Luukas Ilves (Guardtime) and Anna-Maria Osula (Guardtime/TalTech), “The Technological Sovereignty Dilemma – and How New Technology Can Offer a Way Out”, discusses 5G and related topics.
https://cybersecforum.eu/media/ECJ_vol6_issue1.pdf
[2020-03-12] Statistics from the state authentication service shows the usage popularity of eID tools: ID cards are used 44% of the time, Smart-ID 30% and Mobile-ID 22%.
https://forte.delfi.ee/news/tarkvara/uus-seis-smartid-seljatas-mobiilid?id=89203485
[2020-02-04] MKM has published the report “Estonian Cybersecurity R&D Concept” prepared by TalTech. The report gives a good overview of the research institutions and people conducting cybersecurity related research in Estonia.
https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/failid/E_riik/estonian_cybersecurity_rd_concept.pdf
[2020-02-04] A US journalist wrote an article about Estonia and cybersecurity featuring Cyber Defense League and others.
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0204/Cybersecurity-2020-What-Estonia-knows-about-thwarting-Russians
[2019-12-18] A member of the i-voting working group, Heldur-Valdek Seeder, published video recordings of the working group’s meetings on a personal blog. Initially, the minister Kert Kingo wanted to classify the content of the working group, but the majority of members did not support this idea, hence there may be no basis to request removal of the published videos.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimiste-tooruhma-liige-avalikustas-omavoliliselt-koosolekute-videosalvestisi/
[2019-06-05] MSc thesis by Gregor Johannson (TalTech): “Technical Prerequisites for Enabling Third-Party Applications on the New Estonian ID-card”.
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/et/Item/64c83d8f-8f2d-4311-b548-b07c9b58a6cb
[2019-06-06] BSc thesis by Pavel Kargin (TalTech): “Testing the Compliance of the Estonian Electronic Document to the Technical Specification”.
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/et/Item/66881079-2923-42df-acfe-e5dacf3ccad7
[2018-05-31] BSc thesis by Kristel Merilain (TalTech): “Business and Risk Analysis of Electronic Identity Tools Used in Estonia”.
https://digikogu.taltech.ee/et/Item/73c5fa5a-8d43-4548-83f3-78d8dea388a0

Cybersecurity related bachelor’s and master’s theses in University of Tartu 2020 (June)

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Cybersecurity related bachelor’s and master’s theses in University of Tartu 2020 (June)

The defences are taking place on the first and second week of June.

Student: Eric Cornelissen (Computer Science MSc)
Title: Cryptographic Analysis of the Message Layer Security Protocol in the Static Corruption Model
Supervisor: Chris Brzuska, Dominique Unruh
Reviewer: Behzad Abdolmaleki

Student: Risto Pärnapuu (Computer Science MSc)
Title: Verifiable Photo Snapshots
Supervisor: Sven Laur, Ahto Truu
Reviewer: Arnis Paršovs

Student: Anita Onyinye Nwaokolo (Cyber Security MSc)
Title: A Comparison of Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Internet of Vehicle Systems
Supervisor: Raimundas Matulevicius, Abasi-amefon Obot Affia
Reviewer: Pille Pullonen

Student: Rando Tõnisson (Software Engineering MSc)
Title: Security Risk Management in Autonomous Driving Vehicles: Architecture Perspective
Supervisor: Raimundas Matulevičius, Abasi-Amefon O. Affia
Reviewer: Danielle Morgan

Student: Silver Maala (Computer Science BSc)
Title: A Proof of Concept Malware for Interacting with the Smart-ID Android Application
Supervisor: Arnis Paršovs
Reviewer: Mart Oruaas

Student: Kärt Ilja (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Intercepting Network Traffic of the Smart-ID Android Application
Supervisor: Arnis Paršovs
Reviewer: Mart Oruaas

Student: Siim-Alexander Kütt (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Security Analysis of Tartu Smart Bike Share Android Application
Supervisor: Arnis Paršovs
Reviewer: Kristjan Krips

Student: Gregor Eesmaa (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Authorization of Web Requests Based on Merkle Trees
Supervisor: Kristjan Krips
Reviewer: Arnis Paršovs

Student: Hendrik Eerikson (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Privacy Preserving Fingerprint Idenfication
Supervisor: Riivo Talviste, Kristjan Krips
Reviewer: Jan Villemson

Student: Sergei Kuštšenko (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Implementation of election bulletin board using HyperLedger Fabric
Supervisor: Ivo Kubjas
Reviewer: Jan Villemson

Student: Markus Punnar (Computer Science BSc)
Title: Cryptosystem for Post-Quantum Age Based on Moderate-Density Parity Check (MDPC) Codes
Supervisor: Vitaly Skachek, Irina Bocharova
Reviewer: Raul Martin Rebane

Links:
https://www.cs.ut.ee/sites/default/files/cs/kaitsmised_-_defences_ver04-06-20.pdf
https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/index.php?year=2020

Cyber Security master’s theses defense in TalTech (May/June 2020)

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Defence of master theses of Cyber Security curriculum on May 28th 2020 online

Time: 10:00
Student: Cheng-Yu Lu
Title: Analyse Journal of XFS Filesystem for Assisting in Event Reconstruction
Supervisor: Pavel Laptev
Reviewer: Hayretdin Bahsi

Time: 10:40
Student: Simon Victor Jean Laurent Brun
Title: Comprehensive Digital Forensics Analysis of Smart Home Environment
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi, Pavel Tšikul
Reviewer: Matthew Sorell

Time: 11:20
Student: Shaymaa Mamdouh Mohammed Radwan Khalil
Title: Analysis of Windows 10 Hibernation File
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi, Pavel Tšikul
Reviewer: Matthew Sorell

Time: 12:40
Student: Kevin Patric Schmidt
Title: EXTRACTION OF FORENSIC ARTIFACTS FROM HOME ROUTERS
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Matthew Sorell

Time: 13:20
Student: Weerarathna Patabendige Samoda Abeydeera
Title: Fileless Malware Detection in Cloud Environment Using Machine Learning Techniques
Supervisor: Alejandro Guerra Manzanares
Reviewer: Sven Nõmm

Defence of master theses of Cyber Security curriculum on May 29th 2020 online

Time: 10:00
Student: Andreas Jürimäe
Title: The Effectiveness of DMARC and Usage of DMARC in Estonian Government Institutions
Supervisor: Kieren Lovell
Reviewer: Dan Heering

Time: 10:40
Student: Liubomyr Kushnir
Title: Benchmarking of Post-hoc Local Interpretability Methods for Classifying Malicious Traffic
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi, Sven Nõmm
Reviewer: Alejandro Manzanares

Time: 11:20
Student: Huu Phuc Nguyen
Title: Research Method in Detecting Swapped Face Image and Video Forgery
Supervisor: Matthew Sorell
Reviewer: Pavel Tšikul

Time: 12:40
Student: Rohin Sambath Kumar
Title: Analyzing the Face Value of Fake Accounts in Online Social Networks
Supervisor: Birgy Lorenz
Reviewer: Adrian Venables

Time: 13:20
Student: Mykyta Zaitsev
Title: Developing learning pathways for massive open online courses by the example of the rangeforce cyberskills training platform
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel, Margus Ernits
Reviewer: Birgy Lorenz

Time: 14:00
Student: Martin Chmelař
Title: Utilizing Mitre att&ck to Create Adversary Reports of Live-fire Cybersecurity Exercises for Feedback Purposes
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Rain Ottis

Time: 14:40
Student: Ilkin Huseynov
Title: The Analysis of the Current Cyber Security Actions Taken in the e-Government of Azerbaijan and Proposal of the Improvement Plan
Supervisor: Mika Juha Kerttunen
Reviewer: Adrian Venables

Time: 15:20
Student: Belgin Tastan
Title: Comparing the Security Assessment Models on the Detection of Critical Vulnerabilities in Web Services
Supervisor: Mika Kerttunen, Andro Kull
Reviewer: Pavel Tšikul

Defence of master theses of Cyber Security curriculum on June 1st 2020 in ICT-315 (closed defences) & online

Time: 10:00
Student: Juri Kononov
Title: Network Policy Management is Service Rich Environment
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel, Jaan Priisalu
Reviewer: Mart Järvi, Uko Valtenberg

Time: 10:40
Student: Maria Toomsalu
Title: Vulnerability Analysis of an Organisation on the basis of a Semi-Formal Model
Supervisor: Peeter Laud, Jaan Priisalu
Reviewer: Aleksandr Lenin

Time: 11:20
Student: Kaarel Allemann
Title: Effects of the New Integration Design on the KOLT Security
Supervisor: Ahto Buldas
Reviewer: Aleksandr Lenin

Time: 14:00
Student: Fernando Gonzalo Bauzá Sáinz De Baranda
Title: How to Mess with Log Collectors and Analyze their Response in Microsoft Networks with an Example of the Elk Stack
Supervisor: Toomas Lepik
Reviewer: Risto Vaarandi

Time: 14:40
Student: Andres Pihlak
Title: Continuous Docker Image Analysis and Intrusion Detection Based on Open-source Tools
Supervisor: Mauno Pihelgas
Reviewer: Kristian Kivimägi

Time: 15:20
Student: Maarja-Liisa Tammepõld
Title: Securing the centralized logging system by the example of Elasticsearch
Supervisor: Toomas Lepik
Reviewer: Risto Vaarandi

Defence of master theses of Cyber Security curriculum on June 2nd 2020 online

Time: 10:00
Student: Kadri Cahani
Title: Aligning Information Security Risks with Strategic Goals
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Kaie Maennel

Time: 10:40
Student: Martin Leppik
Title: Improving AWS S3 Security at a Medium-sized Company: Challenges and Solutions
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Tiia Sõmer

Time: 11:20
Student: Karl Lubja
Title: Systematic Generation of Cyber Attack Scenarios Against A Ship
Supervisor: Hayretdin Bahsi
Reviewer: Olaf Maennel

Time: 12:40
Student: Illia Petrash
Title: User Behaviour During Covid-19 from the Perspective of a Telco Server
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Toomas Lepik

Time: 13:20
Student: Rishikesh Ram Shankaran
Title: Comparative Study on Perception and Preparedness of a User Towards Cybersecurity Threats in IoT and Mobile Devices
Supervisor: Stefan Sütterlin
Reviewer: Eneken Tikk

Time: 14:00
Student: Ilja Šmarjov
Title: OWASP secure coding practices checklist and training: assessment of effectiveness in a technology company
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Margus Ernits

Time: 14:40
Student: Marvin Uku
Title: Evaluation method for smart home and smart grid authentication protocols
Supervisor: Olaf Maennel
Reviewer: Hayretdin Bahsi

Time: 15:20
Student: Sania Akif Malik
Title: The Effect of Interindividual Differences in Metacognitive Accuracy on Cybersecurity Decisions
Supervisor: Stefan Sütterlin
Reviewer: Mika Juha Kerttunen

Cyber Security Newsletter 2020-03-19

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[2020-03-10] The company Unicount has developed an e-service which allows companies to be registered in Estonia using Smart-ID. Companies in the Estonian Business Register can only be directly registered using an ID card or Mobile-ID. The Smart-ID company registration service provided by Unicount is using the company registration API that has been offered since 2017 by the Estonian Business Register.
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/03/10/tanasest-saab-ettevotteid-asutada-smart-idga
https://news.err.ee/1061645/estonian-companies-can-now-be-established-using-only-smart-id
https://www.baltictimes.com/estonia__1st_company_founded_with_use_of_smart-id_registered_on_tuesday/
[2020-03-06] A large-scale cyber attack simulation exercise developed by CybExer Technologies was conducted bringing together 12 Estonian companies and institutions.
https://news.err.ee/1060615/cyber-exercise-brings-together-defense-league-public-and-private-sector
[2020-03-03] Yet another cybersecurity index has placed Estonia in the 58th position. According to the study, 1.59% of mobiles and 13.2% of computers in Estonia are infected with malware.
https://www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/cybersecurity-by-country/
[2020-02-26] For several years, the Estonian ID card software recognized digital signatures created with revoked certificates as valid signatures. Software libraries used by Estonian e-service providers are likely still affected. The EU-developed eSignature DSS library and libraries used in other EU countries are also affected.
https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/tartu-ulikooli-turvaspetsi-jarjekordne-avastus-id-kaardi-tarkvaras-oli-aastaid-kriitiline-auk?id=89080065
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYG17IGOCi0
[2020-02-26] A Smart-ID account can now be created using biometrics. In the enrollment process the Smart-ID app over NFC retrieves person’s photo from their biometrical passport and uses phone’s camera to perform face recognition. For biometrical passport reading Smart-ID uses Dutch company’s InnoValor NFC-based ReadID software, but for face recognision a cloud service provided by UK company iProov. Contrary to the claims, the security guarantees provided by this technology are quite weak, since the facial verification technology at best can verify only the presence of the person and not their intent to create a Smart-ID account. Fortunately, the person is required to confirm their intent either using previous Smart-ID account (including non-qualified) or a security code sent over email or SMS.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-vottis-biomeetriliste-passide-toega-smart-id-labivaatamiseks-ajapikendust/
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6884293/smart-id-kasutajad-peavad-olema-valmis-uuenduseks
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/smart-id-kasutajaks-saab-nuud-biomeetriaga-kuidas-see-kaib/
https://news.err.ee/1056955/biometric-registration-made-available-to-users-of-smart-id
https://www.iproov.com/newsroom/blog/estonian-digital-identity-with-iproov
[2020-02-26] Self-censorship at UT. The university decided not to publish an article in the University of Tartu magazine, Universitas Tartuensis, about a cooperation agreement between the university and Huawei. Since the Chinese company Huawei is perceived as a potential threat to national security, the Huawei topic has become sensitive.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/kuum/tartu-ulikool-keelas-ajakirjanikul-huawei-teemalise-artikli-avaldamise?id=89042773
https://www.err.ee/1058339/tartu-ulikool-lubab-huaweiga-koostood-tehes-jargida-eesti-julgeolekuhuve
https://news.err.ee/1056839/paper-university-of-tartu-refused-to-publish-article-on-huawei
[2020-02-25] Teachers and system owners of e-school environments are discussing the acceptable duration of an authenticated session after which the user is automatically logged out. According to RIA, session length is not specified in the ISKE implementation guide and it is up to the system owner.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/opetajate-protest-e-opilaspaevikiku-kasutusmugavuse-osas-toi-kaasa-turvariski/
[2020-02-20] The e-shop reset.ee closed its doors leaving at least 275 customers without money. The police do not consider it a scam but a a civil offense, inviting victims to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tarbijakaitse-saatis-politseisse-reseti-asjus-kuriteoteate-aga-politsei-ei-alusta-uurimist/
[2020-02-12] The state pays for Smart-ID on a per use basis – the more users use Smart-ID, the more the state will have to pay (SK offers volume discounts). Smart-ID users outnumber Mobile-ID users two-to-one today. At the end of 2019, there were 230,000 Mobile-ID users and 430,000 Smart-ID users.
https://news.postimees.ee/6898254/estonia-to-create-new-digital-identification-tool
[2020-02-12] The state’s Mobile-ID contract will expire in 2022. RIA and PPA will announce the procurement for a new eID solution this year. The state does not want to copy Smart-ID, but instead use something else possibly based on biometrics.
https://news.postimees.ee/6898254/estonia-to-create-new-digital-identification-tool
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6897706/eesti-asub-looma-uut-inimeste-tuvastamise-vahendit
[2020-02-12] The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service has published their 2020 report. It contains a section on Russian cyber operations in 2019 and mentions potential Chinese threats including Huawei.
https://www.valisluureamet.ee/pdf/raport-2020-en.pdf
[2020-02-12] A ridiculous incident was reported which highlighted the core weakness in Mobile-ID (and Smart-ID). A customer of Luminor Bank unexpectedly logged into a stranger’s bank account. The customer accidentally entered the wrong username and the correct owner of the username confirmed the login with his Mobile-ID. The bank acknowledged that similar incidents have happened before. SEB bank also confirmed similar incidents.
https://epl.delfi.ee/uudised/kogemata-voorale-kontole-turvarisk-toob-netipanka-uue-lahtri?id=88906895
[2020-02-12] RIA is analyzing the risks of enabling i-voting on iOS and Android mobile devices. It will also have to be decided whether to allow voting using Smart-ID in the next elections. The final decision will rest with the National Electoral Committee.
https://news.postimees.ee/6898254/estonia-to-create-new-digital-identification-tool
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-otsustab-juba-jargmisel-kuul-kas-valimistel-saab-e-haalt-anda-smart-id-ga/
[2020-02-11] RIA and PPA launched a cybercrime information website (cyber.politsei.ee) where people are asked to report suspicious emails, account hijacking, money stolen from accounts, etc. The data will be used to inform the public about new crime schemes and to help investigate cases.
https://news.err.ee/1033928/police-launch-cybercrime-information-website
[2020-02-10] After the Tartu Smart Bike Share website had a security flaw which gave access to personal data of registered users, the Data Protection Inspectorate conducted a proceeding on the activities of the Tartu City Government over a longer period of time and concluded that the data leak did not pose a risk to users.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tartu-rattaringluse-andmeleke-ei-kujutanud-kasutajatele-ohtu/
[2020-02-05] The Estonian ID software introduced an option to sign documents with Smart-ID. Smart-ID signing in DigiDoc4 client uses the additional security measure of the Smart-ID app – the users have to choose the right verification code out of three (similar to LHV bank). Smart-ID support is also planned for Android and iOS DigiDoc apps.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-lisab-digiallkirjastamise-tarkvarale-smart-id-toe-soov-on-see-lisada-ka-mobiiliappidele/
https://www.id.ee/index.php?id=39777
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/ria-id-tarkvara-voimaldab-nuudsest-smart-idga-digiallkirjastada.html
[2020-02-04] Remote verification will be launched in the e-Notary self-service portal enabling notarial acts to be carried out at Estonia’s foreign representations without physically visiting a notary’s office. In order to perform remote verification, the customer will need an Estonian ID-card, digital ID, Mobile-ID or an e-resident’s digital ID. The personal identification system of the participants will use Veriff’s biometric face recognition technology.
https://news.err.ee/1031373/notary-acts-can-be-carried-out-in-foreign-embassies-from-february
https://www.err.ee/1034421/eesti-notarite-koda-loi-voimaluse-sooritada-toiminguid-interneti-kaudu
https://news.err.ee/1063131/estonian-embassies-join-e-notar-distant-authentication-pilot-project
[2020-01-30] RIA introduced a state signing service (SiGa) to replace DigiDocService. The service allows the creation of documents digitally signed with ID card and Mobile-ID and the validation of signatures. The service is provided to all persons performing public tasks. The software used by the service is public and allows anyone to run a similar service themselves.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/ria-vastvalminud-riigi-allkirjastamisteenus-hoiab-asutuse-kulusid-kokku.html
[2020-01-17] UT, CybExer Technologies, NATO CCDCOE, Thinnect and Elisa Eesti will create a cyber defense environment in the simulation of critical information infrastructure protection on a cyber training ground (whatever it is).
https://news.err.ee/1025354/project-started-to-make-cyberdefense-for-public-and-private-infrastructure
[2020-01-16] A draft bill initiated by MKM would require telecoms to seek state permission when introducing new hardware and software. The security of any new tech will additionally be monitored by RIA, the Internal Security Service (ISS) and the state’s foreign intelligence agency. The restrictions are likely motivated to keep 5G networks away from the Chinese company Huawei, which is suspected of being controlled by the communist Chinese government.
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6826879/eesti-sidetehnika-hakkab-labima-julgeolekukontrolli
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6859100/it-minister-karu-esimene-tagasilook-oluline-eelnou-tunnistati-pohiseaduse-vastaseks
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/01/28/valitsus-tahab-oigust-lubada-ning-keelata-eesti-sidevorkudes-kasutatavat-tehnoloogiat
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6873351/minister-karu-noudis-huaweilt-aru
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6871738/eesti-hakkab-tehnikat-politiseerima
https://www.ituudised.ee/uudised/2020/03/16/sidevorkude-turvalisust-puudutav-eelnou-sai-taiendust-ja-saadeti-teisele-lugemisele
https://news.err.ee/1020859/telecoms-security-bill-may-exclude-huawei-from-estonian-market-firm-says
[2020-01-15] Estonian-based web security company WebARX found a critical vulnerability in the popular WordPress plugin InfiniteWP Client and WP Time Capsule.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-veebiturbe-ettevote-leidis-kriitilise-haavatavuse-mis-mojutab-poolt-miljonit-veebilehte/
[2020-01-14] Cybernetica will create an automated threat information system between the US Air Force and the Estonian Defense Forces. The US-Estonian cyber-security alert information exchange system will cost €3.54 million. The contract was granted to Cybernetica without competition.
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6873957/cybernetica-sai-riigilt-magusa-miljonilepingu-ilma-konkurentsita
https://www.err.ee/1023814/eesti-ja-usa-alustasid-kuberkaitsealast-koostood-ohuteabe-vahetamiseks
https://news.err.ee/1023833/estonia-and-the-us-to-build-joint-cyber-threat-intelligence-platform
[2020-01-14] In 2019, PPA instituted 12 disciplinary proceedings due to police officers making non-work related inquiries to the police information system. The police officer who made 35 queries was fired.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/politsei-karistas-uheksat-ametnikku-andmebaaside-vaarkasutamise-eest-uks-kaotas-too/
[2020-01-10] Due to technical issues at RIA, the notification service using @eesti.ee email address was disrupted between December 19 and January 7. In total 85,000 emails were not delivered in this period.
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6869462/rikke-tottu-ei-joudnud-85-000-riigi-ametlikku-teadet-inimesteni
[2020-01-10] Geenius has contacted the biggest banks in Estonia, asking whether they have enabled security features to prevent criminals using their domain names in e-mail spoofing attacks. Danske Bank, Svenska Handelsbanken, Citadele, SEB and Bigbank has introduced DMARC to prevent e-mail spoofing attacks. Swedbank is still (already for a half a year) considering implementing DMARC. In LHV’s opinion, DMARC implementation is too complicated.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-pangad-on-hakanud-agaramalt-kasutama-tehnoloogiat-millega-e-kirja-pettuseid-valtida/
[2020-01-08] A family doctor helpline service has been opened offering personalized advice. The hotline staff will have access to a patient’s medical records if the caller grants consent authenticating with Mobile-ID or Smart-ID.
https://news.err.ee/1021433/family-doctors-advice-helpline-cannot-issue-repeat-prescriptions
[2020-01-07] The court denied the early release of Aleksei Vasilev, a 20-year-old student from Kingisepp convicted for finding flaws in the computer networks of Estonian state agencies on the orders of FSB. His 4-year sentence will end on November 4, 2021.
https://news.err.ee/1021428/court-denies-early-release-to-russian-man-convicted-of-working-for-fsb
https://news.err.ee/1010629/court-to-discuss-releasing-juvenile-convicted-of-spying-for-fsb-early
[2020-01-04] The Minister of the Interior was asked how many cases of illegal surveillance have been investigated by authorities. According to the response, 17 cases of private surveillance were registered in 2016, 71 cases in 2017, 22 cases in 2018 and 24 cases in 2019. There was one confirmed case of illegal surveillance and covert listening in 2017.
https://news.err.ee/1020497/authorities-not-interested-in-former-minister-s-bugged-office-claims
[2020-01-03] The database leakage of e-shop charlot.ee will be investigated by Latvian Data Protection Inspectorate, as the leaked database contained more data about clients in Latvia.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-ajaloo-suurimat-e-poe-andmeleket-uurivad-edasi-latlased/
[2020-01-03] SK ID Solutions has paid a contractual penalty to AS LHV Pank for disruptions in the functioning of the Mobile-ID service, as the maximum permitted downtime of 45 minutes was exceeded in 2019. SEB, Swedbank and Luminor refused to disclose whether they have sought contractual penalties from SK ID Solutions.
https://news.err.ee/1020240/sk-id-solutions-pays-penalty-to-lhv-for-disruptions-in-mobile-id-service
[2020-01-01] Personnel rotation in RIA. In December, Andrus Kaarelson, Deputy Director General of the State Information System Branch at the RIA has left RIA returning to work in the private sector. Margus Arm, previously the head of the Electronic Identity Department has been appointed Deputy Director General of the State Information System Branch. The new head of RIA’s Electronic Identification Department is now Mark Erlich. In December, Lauri Aasmann took over as the new RIA Deputy Director General for Cybersecurity. Aasmann came to RIA from the NATO CCD COE, where he led a team of lawyers. Previously, he worked as a lawyer at Swedbank AS and as a prosecutor at the Northern District Prosecutor’s Office and Tallinn Prosecutor’s Office, where he dealt with white-collar crime and cybercrime.
https://www.err.ee/1010537/ria-kuberturvalisuse-teenistuse-juhiks-sai-lauri-aasmann
https://news.err.ee/1020294/margus-arm-appointed-state-information-system-chief-at-ria
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/ria-peadirektori-asetaitjaks-sai-margus-arm.html
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigi-infosusteemi-ameti-uks-tippjuhte-suundub-toole-erasektorisse/
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-detsember-2019.html
[2019-12-31] A software engineer found a flaw in the Elisa home router which gives access to the management password and access to the router over SSH. Elisa claims that this flaw can only be used by clients themselves, but cannot be used to access other client’s devices.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/elisa-koduinterneti-ruuterist-avastati-turvaauk-mis-voimaldab-saada-ligipaasu-tehnilise-kasutaja-paroolile/
[2019-12-28] Märt Põder gave the presentation “DEBRIEF ON E-VOTING IN ESTONIA” at the 36th Chaos Communication Congress (36C3), explaining his view on the i-voting in Estonia.
https://events.ccc.de/congress/2019/wiki/index.php/Projects:Netizen_index_of_e-voting_requirements
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1ON01Fej5w7cnBmTsTIxnaoWFIh_LhuuaoAGkKFAZ0EE/edit?folder=0AKv1cHIDbJwmUk9PVA
https://twitter.com/trtram/status/1211007098194219009
[2019-12-23] A fraud case involving fake tara deposit checks caused €12,925 in damages. The fake checks were printed with a cashier printer on the same paper as the real checks. The criminals understood the composition of the bar code and configured the printer so that the printout would deceive the Maxima checkout system that prevents the use of a copy of a check receipt. It turned out that the checks were printed by IT specialist from the company that serviced tara vending machines at Maxima stores. The criminals were tracked down using CCTV footage that is stored by the store for 30 days.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/kuum/aasta-krimiullatus-voltsitud-taaratsekkidega-raha-kokku-ajanud-kelmid-tootasid-nagu-mafioosod?id=88435809
[2019-12-23] The Supreme Court expressed its position in the case where a woman gave her ID card and PIN codes voluntarily to a man who ordered some merchandise in her name from Telia e-shop using ID card authentication. The case has been sent back to district court. According to the Supreme Court, in case the owner voluntarily gives his ID card with PIN codes to another person who uses the ID card to enter into a transaction, the transaction (or digital signature) may be valid based on the provisions of “entry into transaction through representative” (General Part of the Civil Code Act – GPoCCA – Chapter 8). As the court referenced GPoCCA § 131, this construction can still be attacked and the signed contract later annulled.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/sisuturundus/e-identimise-vahendite-turvalisest-hoidmisest-ja-tehingutest?id=88465617
https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid?asjaNr=2-16-124450/77
[2019-12-21] MyHits radio uploaded, on Google Docs, a publicly available document containing names, phone numbers and email addresses of all participants in their prize game. The link was embedded in the source code of the prize game website. The subjects and Data Protection Inspectorate have been informed.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/myhitsi-auhinnamangu-osalejate-andmed-olid-koigile-huvilistele-kattesaadavad/
[2019-12-20] A group of Estonians used blank chip and PIN cards containing stolen credit card data to empty bank accounts of Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani victims. The criminals also attempted to order 17 phones in total from Klick using a Japanese credit card, but were reported to the police.
https://news.postimees.ee/6855114/estonian-gang-emptied-indian-bank-accounts
[2019-12-19] The Supreme Court of Estonia ruled that the bill expanding EDF surveillance rights is unconstitutional. The court said that the covert collection and processing of personal data may be necessary for the effective defense of domestic and external peace, however, legislation should establish efficient procedural guarantees similar to those set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to eliminate the possibility of the person against whom surveillance is conducted not being informed of the EDF having processed their data.
https://news.err.ee/1015626/top-court-bill-seeking-to-expand-edf-surveillance-rights-unconstitutional
[2019-12-18] A secret camera was found at a metal company AKG Loots. The high-tech camera was installed under the ceiling of the production workshop and was in constant communication. Industrial espionage is suspected, as the company has several international clients with classified contracts.
https://ekspress.delfi.ee/teateid-elust/metallifirmas-leiti-salajane-jalgimisseade?id=88407489
[2019-12-17] From 2020 PPA will introduce a 5 EUR fee for obtaining a new ID card PIN envelope.
https://raha.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/uuest-aastast-saab-id-kaardi-ja-passi-soodsamalt-tellida/
[2019-12-16] Mobile-ID was down for two hours.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/selgus-eilse-mobiil-id-kahetunnise-katkestuse-pohjus/
https://news.err.ee/1014529/mobile-id-service-in-estonia-disrupted-now-back-online
[2019-12-14] A Viljandi hospital patient learned that a hospital nurse had viewed her health information and shared it in Facebook messages with her friend. The nurse has been fined for data breach.
https://leht.postimees.ee/6849818/medode-nuhkis-sobranna-mahitusel-voora-inimese-terviseinfo-jarele
[2019-12-12] The i-voting workgroup published the full report with 25 proposals to improve the i-voting system enhancing credibility and managing risks. In the IT Minister’s opinion, several important directions have been outlined and following working groups should be set up to go deeper into the more specific topics. In Märt Põder’s opinion, the report is a failure as the verifiability(?) issue has not been addressed.
https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/e-valimiste_tooruhma_koondaruanne_12.12.2019_0.pdf
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimiste-tooruhma-liige-loppraport-on-minu-jaoks-labikukkumine/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/it-minister-karu-moodustab-e-valimiste-tooruhma-osas-uued-toogrupid/
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimiste-tooruhm-ei-soovi-e-valimisi-ara-lopetada-hoopis-voimalusi-juurde-lisada/
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6844891/kingo-tooruhm-annab-aru-kas-e-valimised-on-eesti-habiplekk
https://news.postimees.ee/6849632/e-voting-task-force-finishes-report-including-25-proposals-for-improving-system
https://news.err.ee/1013585/e-election-taskforce-report-complete-includes-25-improvement-proposals
https://www.err.ee/1013627/tooruhm-tegi-25-ettepanekut-e-valimiste-parendamiseks
https://news.err.ee/1015470/ria-does-not-have-funds-to-implement-e-election-workgroup-s-proposal
[2019-12-12] Florian Hartleb wrote an article “e-Estonia. Europe´s Silicon Valley or a new 1984?”. The article mentions X-Road, personal ID code, DDoS attacks in 2007, Infineon ID card crisis in 2017 and data embassy project. Contrary to the title, the privacy aspects are not discussed in depth.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-27957-8_16
[2019-12-06] Former Minister of Rural Affairs Mart Järvik claimed that he had detected “bugs” in his office in one section of the ceiling. He tried two eavesdropping detection devices borrowed from his friends. Later, according to an unnamed source, the detected device turned out to be a device for amplifying Wi-Fi signals.
https://news.err.ee/1010579/prosecution-we-do-not-know-what-jarvik-is-talking-about
https://news.err.ee/1011075/mart-jarvik-s-letter-to-helme-about-alleged-eavesdropping
https://news.err.ee/1010506/former-minister-says-he-found-listening-device-in-ministry-of-rural-affairs
https://news.err.ee/1011048/rural-affairs-ministry-no-bugging-device-found-in-former-minister-s-office
https://news.err.ee/1012483/reform-mp-asks-mart-helme-about-alleged-illegal-surveillance-of-jarvik
https://news.err.ee/1011441/jarvik-i-haven-t-seen-a-bug-but-the-equipment-detected-it
https://news.err.ee/1011608/paper-jarvik-bugging-device-a-simple-wifi-signal-amplifier
[2019-12-05] A cryptographer from the Republic of Senegal published a subtle attack against the Smart-ID clone detection mechanism described in the original Smart-ID paper. The flaw allows an attacker who has cloned a victim’s Smart-ID app instance to forge signatures before the victim has used his instance, such that when the victim uses his Smart-ID instance, the attacker’s clone which was used to forge signatures is not detected by the server. The flaw lies in the fact that according to the protocol description, the next expected request ID is set by the client and not the server, which means that after the attack the attacker can reset the next request ID to match the request ID stored in the victims Smart-ID instance, thereby leading to the victim’s next request to be accepted by the Smart-ID server. SK has responded that the actual Smart-ID implementation uses an updated clone detection mechanism which is not affected by this flaw.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1412
https://twitter.com/doomsdaysoup/status/1204399972231331846
https://www.skidsolutions.eu/en/News/iacr-published-smart-ids-cryptanalysis/
[2019-12-03] Toomas Vaks, former RIA Deputy Director General for Cybersecurity, wrote an opinion piece about cyber risks.
https://leht.postimees.ee/6840530/toomas-vaks-kas-ja-kes-peaks-kartma-kuberohtu
[2019-12-02] Agu Kivimägi wrote his thoughts about the recently highlighted issue that the time of signing of a digitally signed file can be changed.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/agu-kivimagi-kas-digiallkirja-aega-saab-usaldada/
[2019-12-02] SEB has made an update to its Android mobile app, which now allows SEB customers to make payments by touching a payment terminal with their mobile phone. The app can be used to pay for mobile purchases up to €150 if NFC has been enabled on the phone.
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6839851/seb-apiga-saab-ka-nuud-poes-maksta
[2019-11-29] Phishing attacks against Smart-ID users have advanced. Now attackers are performing active attacks and displaying to victims the correct Smart-ID verification code. The usual defense of comparing verification codes does not work anymore. Now the only defense is to verify that the authentication is performed in the expected web site.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/petturite-ongitsuslehed-muutumas-inimeste-jaoks-usutavamaks.html
[2019-11-29] CERT-EE warned about scam emails sent in the name of SEB bank. A victim from Tartu lost €4,777 in the scam. Security specialists have pointed out that SEB is endangering their clients by not configuring SPF+DMARC to prevent email spoofing using seb.ee domain.
https://kasulik.delfi.ee/news/uudised/hoiatus-tartlane-langes-ohtliku-seb-nimel-leviva-kelmuse-ohvriks-ja-kaotas-pangakontolt-ligi-5000-eurot?id=88072693
https://twitter.com/SadEstonianIT/status/1200422642639130625
https://twitter.com/SadEstonianIT/status/1195009181826404358
[2019-11-27] Registration of marriage is one of the few things that cannot be concluded digitally. The state is now analyzing the possibility of making marriage registration easier and partly accessible through the state portal eesti.ee.
https://news.err.ee/1007521/state-analyzing-online-marriage-registration
[2019-11-26] People sent letters to the Ministry of Justice and the Chancellor of Justice expressing their dissatisfaction with the fact that the real estate owned by them can be searched in the electronic land register by anyone. The land register has now been modified such that only an authenticated user would be able to search for real estate by name or personal identification code leaving an audit trail.
https://tehnika.postimees.ee/6835333/riik-asus-piirama-kinnistusraamatus-tuhnimist
[2019-11-20] A communication channel has been set up between the police and Facebook, allowing police officers to access Facebook account holders’ information in minutes if police the estimates that there is a real risk to human life. If there is no immediate threat, the request will take longer, sometimes a couple of days. In 2019, PPA asked Facebook about 88 accounts, requiring quick response nine times. Account freezes have been requested for 14 accounts.
https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kuidas-ja-kui-kiiresti-saab-politsei-facebookist-katte-kaja-kallase-ahvardajate-ja-teiste-kahtlusaluste-andmed/
[2019-11-20] Using a fake Facebook account, death threats were made towards Reform Party leader Kaja Kallas. According to PPA, the perpetrators are based in Sweden and therefore Kallas’ life was in no immediate danger.
https://news.err.ee/1006702/paper-estonian-and-swedish-police-to-cooperate-over-kaja-kallas-threat
https://news.err.ee/1005823/police-not-opening-criminal-proceedings-into-kaja-kallas-online-threats
https://news.err.ee/1004931/paper-death-threats-against-reform-party-leader-made-in-sweden
[2019-11-20] Rats seriously damaged RIA’s underground optical cable affecting the operation of eesti.ee and the services of the Health Insurance Fund. Although physical network connections are duplicated, these e-services failed to automatically move to another channel.
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-november-2019.html
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/rotid-pohjustasid-riigivorgu-osalise-katkestuse.html
https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/riigivorgu-oine-kaablivahetus-sujus-torgeteta.html
https://m.arileht.delfi.ee/article.php?id=88126529
https://news.err.ee/1005397/ria-hopes-to-remedy-cable-disruptions-with-automatic-devices-in-future
https://news.err.ee/1005241/e-services-inaccessible-after-rats-chew-through-wires
[2019-10-30] The Estonian Research Council has financed the creation of a programmable USB device with a RGB LED and button, which can be programmed, for example, to emulate a keyboard and send key strokes after it is plugged into the computer. The device was given out to high school students in the Robotex event.
https://hackest.org/usb/
[2019-09-25] The requirement for an age check when ordering alcohol online is not enforced by all e-shops. Some parcel terminals require the ID card of an adult to be inserted, but the terminal does not ask for a PIN code (which means that the process does not involve any cryptography).
https://epl.delfi.ee/uudised/e-poest-alkoholi-tellides-piisab-taisealise-id-kaardist?id=87524573
[2019-04-26] TalTech in cooperation with others have created a High School Cyber Security Selection Course Digital Textbook. The textbook contains material on various topics and includes a lot of unseen video materials.
https://web.htk.tlu.ee/digitaru/kyberkaitse/
[2017-01-27] In Tallinn Circuit Court, defendants contested the integrity of an electronic evidence (a virtual machine image containing Skype logs), based on the fact that the integrity of the disk image was provided by calculating the hash using the outdated MD5 hash function. The defendants demonstrated a practical MD5 collision attack by showing that when opening two visually different image files the calculated MD5 hash value of the files was the same. The court correctly noted that while the MD5 function is not collision resistant, it is still second pre-image resistant guaranteeing the integrity of the collected evidence.
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5081

Defence of Cyber Security Engineering Diploma Theses at TalTech IT College (January 2020)

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January 22nd at 15-17, TalTech IT College, Raja 4C, Tallinn at room 217:

Chairman of the Defence Committee: Priidu Paomets
The Defence Committee: Mohammad Tariq Meeran, Kaido Kikkas, Aleksei Talisainen, Toomas Lepikult

Title: Countermeasures to Deepfakes
Student: Gabriel Apeh Adoyi

Title: Implementing Authentication and Authorization in Dynamic Web Applications
Student: Christian Cataldo

Title: Windows User Simulation for Scalable Cybersecurity Training Platform
Student: Kustas Kurval

Grades (in random order): 5, 2, 1

Links: