According to the terms and conditions of the contract, the subject of audit is: ballot counting software, software for voters, election web site and other technical infrastructure related to e-voting.
Through this, the RIA wants to make sure that there are no vulnerabilities in the system or applications which would make it possible to see or change the voting results or otherwise manipulate the system. The security examiner must draw up a report on security threats in which the potential hazard scenarios are highlighted and suggestions on how to correct the errors are provided.
The testing is organized by the RIA before all elections, using the expertise of various experts. “We can not talk about the results of the earlier security tests, because this information is confidential in terms of security. As far as I can say, the current testing period is around one month, and it also leaves enough time to ensure that if there are any bottlenecks or security problems we will have time to fix them.” said RIA spokeswoman Helen Uldrich.
Indeed, the results of the penetration tests are kept secret. The terms of the procurement stipulate that at the end of the test the reports must be submitted digitally signed and encrypted. Security tests are performed in a test environment and if necessary a secure channel for testers can be created. The i-voting environment is open only to computers with specific IP addresses that are notified to RIA.
Two companies have been chosen to do pentest and two bugs have been found:
Penetration tests were carried out by Clarified Security from Estonia and the worldwide Finnish company Nixu, whose work resulted in detection of two errors in the new system. According to specialists, this is not something tragic, but part of the normal software development.