• [2023-03-16] I-voting in the 2023 Riigikogu elections (RK2023) took place from February 27th to March 4th. A new i-voting record was set with 313,514 votes (51%) being i-votes, meaning that i-voting has become the primary channel for voting. The biggest share of i-votes went to the Reform Party (above 60%). I-votes cast for EKRE and Center Party were around 30%. Several voting related incidents were observed and are covered below.
  https://news.err.ee/1608904730/estonia-sets-new-e-voting-record-at-riigikogu-2023-elections
  https://news.err.ee/1608905990/state-electoral-office-chief-no-election-complaints-filed-yet
  https://news.err.ee/1608906230/online-voting-how-estonia-counts-and-secures-its-electronic-votes
  https://news.err.ee/1608907502/expert-estonia-s-new-e-voting-record-no-surprise
  https://news.err.ee/1608906014/online-votes-make-up-two-thirds-of-reform-less-than-third-of-ekre-votes
• [2023-03-22] The State Electoral Office (RVT) published i-voting statistics. On average, 2’476 i-votes were cast every hour over six days. People were more active in the mornings and evenings. I-voting was most popular among Estonians in the 25-34 age group. The majority of votes were cast for more liberal parties.
  https://news.err.ee/1608922322/online-voting-most-popular-among-estonians-aged-25-34
  https://news.err.ee/1608922796/e-votes-spiked-in-final-hours-of-elections
• [2023-02-27] I-voting started with two minor issues. The voting application was published with a 4-minute delay (09:04) and due to human error, at first, the days counter on the valimised.ee website wrongly displayed that i-vote can be cast after 37 days.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-haaletamine-algas-paari-vaheolulise-viperusega/
• [2023-02-27] On the first day of i-voting, around 7’500 updates in the voter list failed to timely reach the i-voting system. Apparently, the fault emerged as the cronjob was set to execute every 15 minutes, but since there were too many changes to apply, the cronjob did not complete before the process was restarted. As a result, 63 voters cast an i-vote in the wrong electoral district. At first RVT stated that these i-votes are valid, but later decided to cancel them. The affected voters were notified by email asking them to revote. In the middle of the voting period 50 voters had re-voted, the remaining 13 voters were notified again via SMS. However, 3 of the voters did not revote and their i-votes were removed from the ballot box before tallying the i-votes. This created a precedent, because these 3 i-votes were removed from the ballot box based on a non-verified assumption that the corresponding cryptograms contain an invalid candidate number. These votes should have been left in the ballot box where they would be verified and declared invalid during the tallying process.
  https://news.err.ee/1608898568/voter-roll-updates-not-in-system-by-start-of-online-voting-monday-morning
  https://news.err.ee/1608901154/commission-cancels-e-votes-cast-by-people-voting-at-former-addresses
  https://www.err.ee/1608901067/valimiskomisjon-tuhistab-vanas-ringkonnas-e-haaletanute-haaled
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/valimisteenistus-ei-avastanud-e-haaletuse-viga-ise-vaid-selle-tuvastasid-valijad/
  https://www.valimised.ee/et/varske-valijate-nimekirja-info-joudis-e-haaletamise-susteemi-viibega
  https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1630201509911711744
  https://www.riigikogu.ee/download/0675f899-d955-4710-ad69-39d3137f84ce
  https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid/?asjaNr=5-23-11/2
  https://twitter.com/VotingVillageDC/status/1692032271791034603
• [2023-03-06] The Chairman of EKRE announced that i-voting is not serious and that EKRE will contest the i-vote in court unless it is made public how the votes came in, where they come from and how they were counted. EKRE submitted a request to RVT asking for all i-voting system logs as well as information about the developers and persons that have access to the i-voting system. RVT provided some names of the persons involved and offered EKRE auditors to recount the votes. However, logs containing personal data cannot be disclosed.
  https://news.err.ee/1608905354/helme-e-voting-not-serious
  https://news.err.ee/1608905744/ekre-vice-chair-curious-estonia-only-european-state-to-put-faith-in-e-vote
  https://news.postimees.ee/7726546/ekre-submits-request-for-information-about-e-voting-system-to-state-electoral-office
  https://news.err.ee/1608906380/justice-chancellor-audit-reports-show-no-problems-with-e-voting
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ekre-tahab-tutvuda-e-valimiste-logidega-mille-avaldamine-ei-ole-seadusega-kooskolas/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/valimisteenistus-on-valmis-ekre-jaoks-e-haali-uuesti-ule-lugema/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ekre-vaidlustas-ametlikult-e-valimiste-tulemused/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/valimisteenistus-lubab-ekre-l-oma-audiitoritega-e-valimisite-susteemi-kontrollida/
  https://news.err.ee/1608914084/committee-finds-ekre-leader-rights-not-infringed-at-riigikogu-election
• [2023-03-09] EKRE appealed to the Supreme Court with a request to declare the result of the i-voting invalid. The main argument of the appeal is that i-voting is unconstitutional as the entire i-voting process is not described in the law. The Supreme Court later dismissed the complaint.
  https://news.err.ee/1608909179/ekre-appeals-e-vote-result-at-supreme-court
  https://news.err.ee/1608910829/martin-helme-we-are-protecting-constitutional-order-in-estonia
  https://news.err.ee/1608909464/lawyer-riigikogu-election-e-vote-unconstitutional-and-cannot-be-counted
  https://www.err.ee/1608909122/ekre-taotleb-riigikohtult-e-haaletuse-tulemuste-tuhistamist
  https://www.err.ee/1608909278/keres-e-haali-ei-saa-arvestada-kuna-need-on-kokku-loetud-pohiseaduse-vastaselt
  https://news.err.ee/1608911129/estonia-s-supreme-court-rejects-ekre-s-e-voting-election-complaint
  https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid?asjaNr=5-23-8/2
• [2023-01-13] According to RVT, starting from the RK2023 election, voters voting in the polling station should be informed if an i-vote has been cast in their name. However, two experiments organized (by the author of this blog post) in polling stations in Tartu show that polling station workers do not inform voters and do not even know where such information can be seen in the election information system. This means that in practice, paper voters do not have means to detect that someone has cast an i-vote in their name.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/martsikuistel-valimistel-selgub-kas-e-valimiste-kuulujuttudel-on-alust/
• [2023-03-08] Dissatisfaction was expressed about the fact that i-voting results were published 3 hours after the end of the voting period. All together: there was a 40-minute delay for finalizing the list of voters; the invalidation of i-votes replaced by paper votes required 45 minutes; and the i-vote tallying process took an entire hour. RVT plans to acquire faster hardware to speed up the tallying process in the future.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/europarlamendi-valimiste-e-haaled-peaksid-saabuma-oluliselt-kiiremini/
  https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1632499854160134145
• [2023-02-28] Allegedly, the Estonian United Left Party (EÜVP) asked its supporters to share photos of their ballot or i-vote, supposedly to protect against election fraud. The Electrocal Commission received several complaints and reminded the public that pressuring people to reveal their voting choices is against the law.
  https://news.err.ee/1608899990/election-commission-tells-voters-to-stop-sharing-ballot-photos
• [2023-03-03] The national broadcasting news program showed a video segment of the President of Estonia casting his i-vote. The vote verification QR code was not hidden and was visible in the video. RVT did not provide a comment on whether someone was able to successfully verify the vote (in the 30 minute period after the vote was cast) and thereby was able to break the secrecy of the President’s i-vote. This case illustrates that the i-voting application fails to communicate to the voter that the QR code is sensitive data and should not be disclosed to others.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ajakirjanikel-oli-teoreetiline-voimalus-president-alar-karise-e-haale-salajasuse-murdmiseks/
• [2023-03-03] A man in Viljandi was dissatisfied with the organization of voting and left the polling station holding his ballot paper. Threats to call the police did not stop the man. Polling station staff contacted the police citing section 163 of the Penal Code, but the police declined to investigate the incident, saying no crime had been committed. We note that ballot papers that have been taken from polling stations introduce a risk since they can be used to enable different forms of vote buying (e.g., chain voting).
  https://news.err.ee/1608903719/electoral-law-tested-as-viljandi-man-walks-off-with-ballot-paper
  https://sakala.postimees.ee/7723786/valimissedeliga-putku-pannud-mees-joudis-politsei-huviorbiiti
• [2023-03-05] Due to human error, one voter was able to vote twice. An employee of a polling station in Lasnamäe issued a ballot paper to the voter, even though the election information system contained information that the voter had already voted. The polling station employee confused the right to vote with the vote that was already given. It is not known in how many polling stations the voter tried to re-vote until he succeeded, but this incident clearly shows that the new election information system is confusing to the polling station employees, and hence such fraud is likely to succeed in a much larger scale. The police initiated misdemeanor proceedings according to the Penal Code in respect to election fraud and the person was fined 240 euros. A similar incident was reported from Kohtla-Järve, but there it turned out that the person went to vote a second time, thinking that he could vote for his ward on the basis of a power of attorney. As there was no reason to suspect malice, in this case misdemeanor proceedings were not initiated.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/uks-valija-sai-jaoskonnas-kaks-korda-haaletada-amet-valistab-infosusteemi-vea/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kaks-korda-valimistel-haaletanud-inimene-sai-valimispettuse-toimepanemise-eest-trahvi/
• [2023-03-01] Estonian digital rights activist Märt Põder published a self-made vote verification application, which can be used to download and inspect the encrypted vote.
  https://github.com/infoaed/kryptogramm
  https://www.err.ee/1608901955/mart-poder-suuname-tahelepanu-demokraatia-opsusteemile
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/en/posts/perils-of-electronic-voting/
• [2023-03-08] Märt Põder was able to cast an i-vote by manually constructing the respective i-voting API requests from Linux command line. Since he only managed to submit the i-vote in the last minute of the i-voting period, he was not able to verify whether his submitted vote can be correctly decrypted using the vote verification application. Therefore, it is very likely that his vote contained an invalid cryptogram and hence this was the i-vote that was declared invalid in the vote tallying process. RVT announced that they will not investigate who cast the invalid i-vote as that would not be in line with the principle of election secrecy.
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/en/posts/perils-of-electronic-voting/
  https://p6drad-teel.net/~p6der/evote-log.html
  https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/digiaktivist-andis-e-valimistel-isetehtud-koodireaga-haale/
• [2023-02-15] During the i-vote encryption key generation process, the i-voting observer Märt Põder requested to ensure that the Windows 10 machine used to generate the private key did not contain malware that could generate a weak key or leak the private key. Märt Põder submitted an official complaint asking RVT to make a copy of the machine’s hard disk available for inspection. In their answer, RVT explained that the inspection of the hard disk did not guarantee absence of malware, e.g., in computer memory or in other components. However, the complaint was partially satisfied by allowing the inspection of the hard disk copy in the premises of RVT.
  https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/328022023004
  https://www.postimees.ee/7719324/valimiskomisjon-rahuldas-soovi-uurida-e-haaletamise-susteemi-kovaketast
  https://twitter.com/trtram/status/1625837567433220097
• [2023-03-24] Märt Põder demonstrated a method showing how a person can reliably prove to third parties the content of the i-vote cast by the person and also prove that this i-vote went into the final tally (i.e., was counted). First, using a custom built vote verification application and the QR code shown after casting the vote, the voter’s vote is retrieved from the vote collector server and decrypted. The vote registration receipt attached to the vote proves that the vote was received by the vote collector server. To prove that this was the last i-vote cast by the person, the person can request digitally signed logs of ID-card/Mobile-ID certificate revocation requests from SK ID Solutions AS. These logs will show the time of the last certificate validity query made by the vote collector server, proving that re-voting did not take place. To prove that the i-vote was not canceled by a paper vote, a digitally signed statement from RVT can be obtained which will answer whether the voter’s i-vote or paper vote was counted in the election.
  https://youtu.be/vWMaoqPY2-M
  https://infoaed.ee/proof2023
  https://infoaed.ee/salajasus/eksperthinnang.pdf
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/valimisteenistus-seletab-lahti-miks-digiaktivisti-vaiteid-e-haale-salajasuse-murdmise-osas-ei-vasta-toele/
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/posts/usaldada-valetamisteenistust/
• [2023-04-06] Märt Põder discovered that the content of i-votes cast in RK2023 does not comply with the technical requirements established by the election commission. In particular, although the decision requires that the EHAK code of the administrative unit must be included in the encrypted ballot, in reality the voting app set it to 0000. While in practice the EHAK code is not required to count the votes, strictly speaking, such votes do not meet the requirements and therefore should be declared invalid and discarded in the tallying process. A similar non-compliance was discovered regarding the digital signature containers constructed by the official voting application. In particular, that they lack signature verification data and show up as invalid when opened with the official DigiDoc client (however, validation data is added by the server and hence a proper signature container should be available on the server side). Märt Põder submitted a complaint, but it was rejected due to being submitted after the deadline. A crime report was submitted to police, but the police has refused to initiate the proceedings. An appeal is currently being processed by the administrative court and an application has been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights.
  https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/312102022001
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/posts/kolmas-lugemine/
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/posts/kehtetute-sedelite-valitsus/
  https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/posts/juurkaebus-2023/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ronald-liive-ekre-l-ja-riigikohtu-esimehel-on-oigus-e-valimised-vajavad-tosist-reguleerimist/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimised-jalle-kohtus-vaatleja-nouab-e-haalte-ebaoige-lugemise-osas-kriminaalmenetlust/
  https://twitter.com/trtram/status/1687392928618909696
• [2023-04-23] According to a complaint by Märt Põder, in RK2023 an i-vote cast in the last minute could only be verified for 15 minutes rather than 30 minutes as prescribed by the regulation. According to RVT, the i-voting system is shut down 15 minutes after the end of the i-voting period. The current i-voting system does not support a feature where the vote collector would stop accepting new i-votes but would still allow the last votes to be verified.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimiste-haalekontroll-lulitati-liiga-vara-kinni/
• [2023-03-01] A group of election observers led by Märt Põder, issued a joint statement and petition demanding i-voting to be made observable, proposing five specific legal and procedural changes in order to achieve that. In particular, the proposal is to: (1) provide legal means for observers to file complaints based on their observations; (2) make it possible to observe the voting processes from their first step to the last; (3) each IT-related i-voting activity must be made legally contestable; (4) the dispute period for i-voting must be extended; and (5) all i-voting related materials and documentation must be made available to observers for familiarization early in the process.
  https://rahvaalgatus.ee/initiatives/7b9ecdfa-3b56-45d4-a0f8-a52ced3e5803?language=en#initiative-header
  https://vaatlejad.github.io/
• [2023-08-31] OSCE published their final report on RK2023. Among i-voting related recommendations: (1) election authorities should proactively address i-voting related concerns raised by entities that distrust i-voting (e.g., EKRE); (2) consider introducing cryptographic methods to prevent invalid ballots reaching ballot box; (3) improve quality assurance to avoid incidents such as the 63 voters who cast votes in an incorrect voting district; (4) the National Electoral Committee (VVK) should publish complete and up-to-date information and code concerning the i-voting system; (5) VVK should improve communication regarding the time that is required to count i-votes; (6) OCSE recommends implementing countermeasures against the attack described by Olivier Peirrera which would circumvent the vote verification process by a malicious voting app simulating an application crash; and (7) OSCE points out that in RK2023 the critical step of removing the re-votes was not audited – this should not happen again.
  https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/estonia/551251
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/osce-tahab-et-eesti-e-valimised-oleksid-rohkem-auditeeritavad/
• [2023-09-14] Even though the Supreme Court dismissed all RK2023 election complaints, in a competing opinion the President of the Supreme Court (Villu Kõve) pointed out the challenges of assessing i-voting related complaints and drew attention to the fact that the regulation of i-voting needs to be written into the law more thoroughly than before. The Ministry of Justice has prepared legislative amendments, but VVK raises fears over impartiality, as the government would have more say in the organization of i-voting.
  https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/lahendid?asjaNr=5-23-20/6
  https://www.postimees.ee/7794592/intervjuu-riigikohtu-esimees-villu-kove-e-valimised-ei-saa-pohineda-vaid-usul
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigikohus-jattis-ekre-ja-vasakpartei-valimiskaebused-rahuldamata/
  https://news.err.ee/1608932273/supreme-court-dismisses-all-election-complaints
  https://news.err.ee/1608933176/ekre-will-not-further-contest-march-5-riigikogu-election-result
  https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120158604/ekre-laheb-e-haaletamise-vaidlustamisega-riigikohtus-uuele-katsele
  https://news.err.ee/1608914885/electoral-committee-rejects-united-left-party-and-ekre-election-complaints
  https://news.err.ee/1608919430/electoral-committee-rejects-ekre-election-complaint-filed-past-deadline
  https://news.err.ee/1608920858/ekre-once-again-appeals-march-5-election-e-vote-with-supreme-court
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-riigi-endine-peaarhitekt-e-valimiste-puhul-ei-ole-liigset-jaakriski-tuvastatud/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/president-karis-uuele-riigikogule-seadustes-peab-olema-kirjas-koik-oluline-mis-puudutab-e-valimisi/
  https://news.err.ee/1608909215/andres-sutt-security-of-e-elections-has-always-been-a-top-priority
  https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7862306/ago-samoson-e-valimised-on-praegu-usalduse-kusimus
  https://news.postimees.ee/7807258/e-voting-rules-to-be-made-clearer
  https://news.err.ee/1609024067/justice-ministry-sets-about-clarifying-e-voting-rules
  https://news.err.ee/1609099541/amendment-to-electoral-law-raises-fears-over-impartiality

Other events (not related to RK2023):

• [2022-04-27] In 2022, the government allocated 4 million euros for i-voting. Half of it was designated to the development of the election information systems, additional security testing and organization of elections.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/venemaa-soda-ukrainas-suurendab-eesti-e-valimiste-kuberturvalisust/
• [2022-06-21] In 2022, MKM published the KPMG audit report on the security of the election information system and related processes. The audit did not analyze the security of i-voting protocols and its implementation/deployment. The audit found several issues: (1) there is no requirement to perform a security audit on the i-voting system; (2) problems in the risk assessment procedures; (3) the current ad-hoc funding method is not able to guarantee security and continuity of the i-voting system; (4) lack of basic testing before the election cycle. The audit found that from the 25 recommendations of the i-voting working group only 7 have been (somewhat) implemented.
  https://twitter.com/ikubjas/status/1543746621527277568
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/audit-leidis-e-valimistel-14-puudust-ja-mittevastavust-osade-realiseerumist-prognoositakse-jargmise-kolme-aasta-jooksul/
  https://www.mkm.ee/uudised/audit-e-valimised-turvalised
  https://www.mkm.ee/media/7414/download
• [2023-01-17] In December, ITL and Tarvi Martens sent a letter asking VVK to enable i-voting using Smart-ID. According to VVK’s legal interpretation, enabling Smart-ID requires changes to the law. Tartu University researcher Arnis Paršovs, however, draws attention to the security risks of enabling Smart-ID in i-voting.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/segadus-smart-id-ga-juba-seekord-oleks-e-valimistel-peaaegu-saanud-sellega-haalt-anda/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/smart-id-loonud-ettevotte-esindaja-oluline-on-et-inimesel-poleks-vahet-millist-eid-vahendit-ta-kasutab/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/siseministeeriumi-asekantsler-selgitab-miks-nad-ei-toeta-smart-id-lubamist-valimistel/
• [2023-09-29] RIA has tasked Cybernetica to create a prototype i-voting application for smartphones. The app has been developed and supports Mobile-ID and Smart-ID as the authentication means. The coalition agreement of the current government has established the goal to enable m-voting and the government is working to enable it for the EP2024 elections. RVT, however, considers introducing m-voting to be risky, mostly because of the Apple app store, where there is little control over the app’s distribution.
  https://www.ria.ee/en/news/pilot-application-created-e-voting-smart-devices.html
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-valimistest-voib-saada-moodanik-sel-aastal-valmib-m-valimiste-app/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/m-valimiste-api-turvalisuses-ei-ole-veel-veendutud/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/peagi-saab-uuesti-haaletada-kuid-nuud-juba-mobiiliga/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/fotod-m-valimiste-iosi-ja-androidi-appide-esialgne-disain-sai-valmis/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-votab-m-valimiste-api-loomist-vaga-tosiselt-juba-on-kohtutud-appleiga/
  https://valitsus.ee/en/coalition-agreement-2023-2027
  https://www.err.ee/1608991649/valimiskomisjon-m-haaletuse-kasutamine-tooks-kaasa-liiga-palju-riske
  https://mkm.ee/uudised/riisalo-siht-jargmisteks-valimisteks-luua-voimalus-haaletada-nutiseadmega
  https://news.err.ee/1609078918/government-plans-to-allow-voting-by-smart-device-from-next-elections
  https://news.err.ee/1609080746/doris-pold-m-voting-sure-to-boost-turnout
  https://news.err.ee/1608992003/electoral-committee-m-voting-entails-too-many-risks
  https://news.err.ee/1609108271/electoral-committee-chair-worth-keeping-with-times-but-m-voting-risky
  https://news.err.ee/1609109348/legal-scholar-government-can-only-regulate-e-voting-technical-details
• [2023-06-29] The Academy of Sciences established a cybersecurity commission who will examine election security. The commission includes Dan Bogdanov (head), Teet Raidma, Alo Einla, Arne Koitmäe, Kristjan Krips, Ivo Kubjas, Liisa Past, Mihkel Solvak, Ahto Truu, Tarmo Uustalu, Priit Vinkel and Jan Willemson. The desire of the committee members is to raise the quality of the discussion on the security of the e-state and to create supporting tools and models. As a kick-off event, the commission organizes a conference on trust and reliability to discuss the technological and social science aspects of election technology.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/teaduste-akadeemia-hakkab-uurima-valimiste-turvalisust/
  https://www.akadeemia.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/kuberturvalisuse-komisjoni-koosseisu-kinnitamine-2023.06.20_juh-prot-8_vv_%C2%A7-30.pdf
  https://www.akadeemia.ee/en/events/conference-on-trust-and-reliability/
• [2023-03-23] Tartu County Court convicted Allain Karuse for vote buying in Valga at the KOV2021 elections. According to the charges, he promised two persons free diesel fuel – 10 liters in one case and 15 in the other. One person was offered at least €20 in cash. Another person was handed €70 who used it to buy meals for themselves and six other persons in a Valga restaurant. No information is available on whether and how it was ensured that the voters cast the vote for the particular candidate.
  https://news.err.ee/1608924074/tartu-county-court-convicts-allain-karuse-of-vote-buying
• [2022-10-27] The court found Narva politician (Sergei Gorlatš) guilty of vote buying and sentenced him to one year and eight months in prison. The indictment says that Gorlatš organized a trip for 40 people from Narva to Toila that included a tour, SPA visit and picnic. Later, the attendees were permitted to i-vote on Gorlatš’ laptop while still on the bus, among them 17 persons did so.
  https://news.err.ee/1608767971/narva-politician-sergei-gorlats-found-guilty-of-vote-buying

Research articles:

• [2023-08-23] A research article by Tobias Hilt, Kati Sein (Cybernetica), Tanel Mallo (Cybernetica), Melanie Volkamer and Jan Willemson (Cybernetica): “Voter Perception of Cast-as-Intended Verifiability in the Estonian i-vote protocol”. The researchers performed semi-structured interviews with 13 voters to investigate the perception of individual verifiability in online elections in the aftermath of the 2013 parliamentary election in Estonia. The study finds that the voters clearly lack comprehension of the real purpose of the verifiability step (i.e., to detect a malware attack).
  https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/voterperception.pdf
  https://twitter.com/EVoteID/status/1709556280216412465/photo/1
  https://twitter.com/trtram/status/1653773719960006657
• [2023-09-22] A research article by Jan Willemson (Cybernetica) and Kristjan Krips (Cybernetica/UT): “Estimating carbon footprint of paper and Internet voting”. The paper compares the carbon footprint of paper voting in polling stations with the emissions of i-voting in KOV2023. The results show that paper voting has about a 180 times higher carbon footprint, owing largely to the need to transport the voters to the polling stations and back.
  https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/VotingCO2.pdf
  https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-43756-4_9
• [2022-10-01] A research article by Piret Ehin (UT), Mihkel Solvak (UT), Jan Willemson (Cybernetica) and Priit Vinkel (Cybernetica): “Internet voting in Estonia 2005–2019: Evidence from eleven elections”. The article examines Internet voting in Estonia over 15 years and 11 nation-wide elections.
  https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0740624X2200051X
• [2022-09-24] A research article by Cornelia Sindermann, Dmitri Rozgonjuk (UT), Mihkel Solvak (UT), Anu Realo (UT) and Kristjan Vassil (UT): “Internet voting: the role of personality traits and trust across three parliamentary elections in Estonia”. The researchers investigated what affects the decision to use or not use internet voting. The work indicates that, out of the Big Five personality traits, it is only Agreeableness that seems to be related to trust in internet voting and the use of internet voting.
  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-022-03644-4
• [2022-07-19] A research article by Jan Willemson (Cybernetica): “Towards Identifying Social Factors behind (In)Efficiency of Voting Security Measures”. In this article, the author analyzes various social factors that could explain why different countries implement different security measures in their voting systems. E.g., why in Switzerland coercion and vote buying is not part of the threat model, while voting systems in other countries try to implement measures against these attacks.
  https://www.jedem.org/index.php/jedem/article/view/673
• [2022-06-08] Kristjan Krips (Cybernetica/UT) defended his PhD thesis “Privacy and coercion resistance in voting”. Among other things, the work contains a great amount of information about the Estonian i-voting system. The work indicates that the attack resistance of paper voting tends to be overestimated, while the Estonian internet voting system could also be improved.
  https://ut.ee/en/node/138599
  https://kuku.pleier.ee/podcast/kuue-samba-taga/132123
  https://novaator.err.ee/1608635968/doktoritoo-e-haaletamise-kontrollitavusele-seab-piirid-haalteostmise-risk
• [2022-06-06] A research article by Maris Vutt (UT): “Electronic Voting in Adopting Resolutions of Limited Companies: The Example of Estonian Law”. The article provides an overview of how Estonian companies implement electronic voting in shareholders’ meetings. The author finds that although the law contains no precise requirements, it should be taken into account that the procedure laid down for electronic voting must ensure the identification of shareholders as well as the security and reliability of electronic voting.
  http://dx.doi.org/10.13165/j.icj.2022.06.007

• [2021-10-16] The i-voting in the 2021 local municipality elections took place from October 11th to 16th. A new i-voting record was set with 273,620 votes (46%) being i-votes. Around 24,000 i-votes were revotes. The biggest share of i-votes went to the Reform Party. I-votes cast for the Center Party tripled in Tallinn. Several voting related incidents were observed and are covered below.
  https://news.err.ee/1608372258/new-e-voting-record-set-at-2021-local-elections
  https://news.err.ee/1608376163/reform-wins-local-elections-e-vote-again
  https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1046409/keskerakonna-e-haaled-tallinnas-kolmekordistusid
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/94877729/varske-raport-e-haaletamise-perioodil-motlesid-valijad-oma-otsuse-umber-ligi-24-000-korral
• [2021-11-11] The State Electoral Committee (VVK) received an appeal from candidate Andrea Eiche demanding the i-voting results in Lüganuse municipality be annulled due to alleged vote buying activities. The complainant claimed that voters had been “persuaded” to cast an i-vote for a Center Party candidate, both at the Kiviõli Russian School and at a nearby store, with the latter providing gifts in return for doing so. The applicant requested VVK to ascertain how many i-votes had been cast from the store and also from the school’s IP address to specific candidates. The Supreme Court found that processing such data would breach the ballot secrecy. The court found that the allegations lacked sufficient proof, although the court ordered the police to investigate a potential criminal offense.
  https://news.err.ee/1608398816/supreme-court-orders-ppa-investigation-into-alleged-luganuse-vote-buying
• [2021-11-03] Police detained a politician (Sergei Gorlatš) who is suspected of vote buying. According to preliminary data, almost 40 Narva residents were offered a trip, which included a guided walk in the park, a visit to a SPA, a picnic and transport. The trip took place during the election week and people were instructed to bring their ID card to i-vote. The i-voting took place on the bus. People who could not vote due to the lack of an ID card or PIN codes were asked to do so later at the polling station. Almost half of the people were able to vote on that trip.
  https://news.err.ee/1608390995/narva-councilor-suspected-of-vote-buying-suspended-for-at-least-3-months
  https://news.err.ee/1608389642/ppa-investigating-narva-e-vote-buying-case
  https://news.err.ee/1608390413/eesti-200-calls-for-narva-councilor-resignation-after-police-investigation
  https://news.postimees.ee/7376895/member-of-katri-raik-election-coalition-caught-buying-votes
  https://www.err.ee/1608389594/keskkriminaalpolitsei-kahtlustab-narva-poliitikut-haalte-ostmises
• [2021-10-28] The international i-voting security audit procurement failed five times in a row as the companies that applied did not meet the conditions of the procurement. However, the state signed a contract for a total of 200,000 euro with KPMG Baltics OÜ to conduct a narrower scope procedural audit. The audit is supposed to assess all election-related information systems and has to be completed by April 2022. The audit is supposed to assess at minimum: (1) compliance to the OSCE/ODIHR report; (2) the implementation of the proposals made by the i-voting security working group in 2019; (3) compliance of the Council of Europe e-voting standard; and (4) current legislation and processes related to election information systems.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riik-tellis-auditi-mis-selgitab-valja-kuidas-on-kert-kingo-e-valimiste-tooruhma-ettepanekuid-rakendatud/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/suurejooneline-e-valimiste-rahvusvaheline-audit-ebaonnestus-viis-korda-jarjest/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigihangete-vaidlustuskomisjon-ebaonnestunud-e-valimiste-hankest-ei-saa-valistada-vaidlustuse-esitamist/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigi-tugiteenuste-keskus-lukkab-umber-vaite-et-riik-oli-valmis-seadusevastaselt-e-valimiste-hanke-tahtaega-pikendama/
  https://www.postimees.ee/7349546/e-valimiste-auditit-plaanitud-kujul-ja-ajal-ei-tule-too-tegijaid-lihtsalt-ei-ole
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/95066489/ekre-kunagine-eesmark-saab-siiski-teoks-mkm-alustab-e-valimiste-auditeerimist-tegija-valiti-ilma-hanketa
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/94752045/kas-raul-siemil-on-oigus-eesti-e-valimiste-susteemi-ei-suudagi-keegi-revideerida-ja-see-on-oht-eesti-julgeolekule
• [2021-10-28] EKRE submitted a complaint asking for i-voting in the ongoing elections to be declared illegal, as the translation feature of the Google Chrome browser distorted (translated) candidate names listed in the election website kov2021.valimised.ee. On the night of October 13th, the developers of the website added the translate=”no” flag to the candidate list, instructing browsers to not apply translation on that part of the page. National Electoral Committee (NEC) rejected the complaint as the names of the candidates were displayed correctly in the i-voting application. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal assessing the impact of the translation problem as unlikely.
  https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1047049/riigikohus-e-haaletamine-oli-seaduslik
  https://news.err.ee/1608379718/ekre-goes-to-court-over-e-voting-translation-issue
  https://news.err.ee/1608370794/ekre-seeks-annulment-of-e-voting-result
• [2021-10-28] Virgo Kruve submitted a complaint asking for i-voting to be canceled for the local elections due to several issues: (1) the source code of the i-voting application was not publicly available; (2) the software was not audited and the i-voting server was not under the supervision of auditors; (3) paper voters and i-voters were not treated equally as i-voting was not possible on election day; (4) the i-voting application was signed after the i-voting trail; (5) VVK confirmed the results of the i-voting trail after the start of the i-voting period. NEC and the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint: (1) legislation does not require publication of the i-voting application source code or audit of the application; (2) the law does not impose an obligation to use the i-voting application provided by VVK; (3) the vote verification application can be used to check if the correct vote has been cast; (4) there are measures to verify the authenticity of the state-provided i-voting application.
  https://www.ohtuleht.ee/1047049/riigikohus-e-haaletamine-oli-seaduslik
  https://news.err.ee/1608364593/electoral-committee-dismisses-e-voting-organization-complaint
• [2021-10-26] Jan Willemson (Cybernetica) used the unofficial proof-of-concept i-voting application to cast an i-vote in the local elections. The vote was accepted by the vote collector server and passed the mobile vote verification successfully. However, in the ballot box processing phase the vote was discarded as invalid. The cause of the bug is being investigated.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/eksklusiiv/arvutiteadlane-tegi-kattesaadavaks-e-valimiste-koodi-mida-valimisteenistus-on-seni-kiivalt-varjanud/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/uks-valija-loi-endale-isikliku-e-haaletamise-tarkvara/
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/94882233/kahtlus-uks-e-haaletaja-oli-loonud-oma-valimisrakenduse-tema-antud-haal-tunnistati-kehtetuks
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/94898679/valimisteenistus-uksikuritajal-ei-onnestunud-e-valimiste-susteemi-ara-petta
• [2021-10-23] Postimees wrote about indications that ID cards of nursing home customers are abused to cast i-votes. As an example, it was mentioned that a relatively unknown candidate, a close relative of the head of a nursing home, received as many votes as a well-known Estonian politician (nearly a hundred votes) and had an unnaturally high proportion of i-votes – four times as many as paper votes. However, so far none of the allegations that ID cards are being misused in nursing homes have been substantiated.
  https://leht.postimees.ee/7368389/e-valimispettusi-avastada-aitav-info-havitatakse-enne-haaltelugemist
  https://www.postimees.ee/7368573/riigi-valimisteenistus-koik-e-haaletamise-logid-ja-e-haaled-on-alles-ja-turvaliselt-hoiustatud
  https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7370931/erkki-koort-e-haaled-ja-logid-on-alles-aga-pettusi-avastada-ei-aita
• [2021-10-21] A hacker (Artur Boiko) was able to capture a signed i-vote produced by the voting application. The hacker informed the Estonian media that the i-votes cast in the elections are not valid as the DigiDoc4 client showed that the digital signature attached to his i-vote was not valid. RIA explained that the formed signed BDOC container is not a fully completed digital signature, as the OCSP response and timestamp are added on the server side.
  https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/94929547/kurikuulus-hakker-artur-boiko-pakkus-lahkelt-abi-ka-e-haalte-analuusimisel
  https://blog.ria.ee/kuidas-allkirjastatakse-e-haali/
• [2021-10-19] Starting with the local elections this year, it is possible to cancel an i-vote in a polling station also on election day. Before 2021 this was not possible, because the voter lists were on paper. Electronic voter lists were used for the first time and it also enabled voters to vote in any polling station in their district as this information is now maintained in a central database. A total of 1,375 computers and 400 printers were used in polling stations all over Estonia. Most of the equipment was leased from Telia. Almost 2,000 people canceled their i-vote with a paper ballot.
  https://news.err.ee/1608359610/e-votes-can-be-canceled-by-voting-at-polling-stations-on-election-day
  https://news.err.ee/1608374297/almost-2-000-people-canceled-e-vote-with-paper-ballot
  https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/94901777/1775-kasutatud-arvutit-ja-printerit-mis-saab-edasi-valimistel-kasutusel-olnud-tehnikast
• [2021-10-16] On the sixth day of advance voting, voting in polling stations experienced issues from 12:00 to 12:45. The cause was in RIA’s authentication service TARA that is used by the Election Information System VIS3. For security reasons, the number of queries processed from a single IP address was restricted to prevent DoS attacks. During the inaccessibility of VIS3, voters were able to cast paper votes using double envelopes. The electronic list of voters was updated as soon as VIS3 became available again.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ria-loodud-valimiste-infosusteem-tokestas-valimistel-fuusiliselt-haaletamist/
• [2021-10-13] A designer (Stefan Hiienurm) criticized the design of the i-voting application as the application looks like “old-school pirated software” (has been largely the same for about ten years) and there is no indication that this is a service created by the Estonian state. The designer took 30 minutes and sketched how the i-voting application could look.
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/disainer-stefan-hiienurm-e-haaletuse-tarkvara-naeb-valja-nagu-vanakooli-piraattarkvara/
  https://epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/94879211/riigi-valimisteenistuse-juht-arne-koitmae-valijarakenduse-iganenud-kujundusest-sellel-on-teatud-positiivne-efekt
• [2021-10-12] I-voters who had their computer time more than 5 seconds off got an error, although their vote was cast successfully.
  https://www.facebook.com/eestivalimised/photos/a.158329754211315/4745406862170225/?type=3
• [2021-10-11] During the first 11 minutes after i-voting started, a false message was shown to voters by the voting application, stating that it was a test vote that would not be counted. Around 900 of the first i-voters received such a message. The votes were actually counted, as this was a configuration error having effect only on the text displayed. The end time of the test vote was wrongly configured to be an hour later.
  https://twitter.com/valimisedeestis/status/1447445220271009794
  https://news.err.ee/1608366156/e-voting-glitch-which-gave-first-900-voters-inaccurate-information-fixed
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-haaletamine-algas-suure-viperusega-inimesed-ei-tea-kas-nende-haal-laks-arvesse-voi-mitte/
  https://blog.ria.ee/ria-analuutikud-e-haaletamise-torked-ei-avalda-kriitilist-moju-valimiste-labiviimisse/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kaimar-karu-tanane-e-valimiste-prohmakas-oli-lubamatu-alusetud-spekulatsioonid-said-kutet-juurde/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/miks-oli-e-haaletamisega-sel-korral-nii-palju-probleeme/
• [2021-10-11] Users of the latest version of MacOS were unable to i-vote with an ID card until a new voting application was released in the afternoon of the first day of i-voting. More than 30 complaints were registered by technical support service, but hundreds or more users could have been affected. The error was due to the fact that the application was not tested accordingly. I.e., before initially signing the application, the application was not given the right to communicate with the ID card software. The fault was discovered only after i-voting started as the combination of MacOS and ID card was not tested in the i-voting trial.
  https://blog.ria.ee/ria-analuutikud-e-haaletamise-torked-ei-avalda-kriitilist-moju-valimiste-labiviimisse/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-haaletamist-vaevavad-prohmakad-valijad-ei-saanud-rakenduse-oiguses-veenduda-applei-arvutiga-ei-saanud-e-haalt-anda/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/riigi-valimisteenuste-juht-tanased-e-haaletuse-prohmakad-ei-ole-aktsepteeritavad/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ronald-liive-kov-valimiste-e-haaletus-on-kobarkakk-mis-enam-kunagi-korduda-ei-tohi/
• [2021-10-11] The documentation for the MacOS voting application on valimised.ee was inaccurate. The file name of the voting application was different (in the documentation “selection.dmg”, actually “KOV_2021_mac.dmg”), and the cryptographic checksum of the voting application file did not match the checksum in the documentation. The differences arose because the MacOS voting application was updated without it being timely reflected in the documentation.
  https://twitter.com/silverk_/status/1447466479918665728
  https://blog.ria.ee/ria-analuutikud-e-haaletamise-torked-ei-avalda-kriitilist-moju-valimiste-labiviimisse/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/e-haaletamist-vaevavad-prohmakad-valijad-ei-saanud-rakenduse-oiguses-veenduda-applei-arvutiga-ei-saanud-e-haalt-anda/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tanel-tammet-e-haaletuse-eilsed-prohmakad-on-naeruvaarsed/
  https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/ronald-liive-kov-valimiste-e-haaletus-on-kobarkakk-mis-enam-kunagi-korduda-ei-tohi/
• [2021-10-10] The source code of the i-voting system was made public in GitHub only 10 hours before i-voting began.
  https://twitter.com/silverk_/status/1447119983356567552
  https://github.com/vvk-ehk/ivxv/commit/49160800174473502e0bee4c8fa87b7ec75bd6f6
  https://blog.ria.ee/ria-analuutikud-e-haaletamise-torked-ei-avalda-kriitilist-moju-valimiste-labiviimisse/
• [2021-10-04] Arne Koitmäe, the head of the State Electoral Service (VVK), discusses the possibility to i-vote using smart devices.
  https://news.err.ee/1608358833/arne-koitmae-is-estonia-ready-for-m-voting
• [2021-09-21] Postimees received sharp criticism for publishing a cartoon, which puts the Estonian i-voting system and the Russian i-voting system on the same stick. Postimees reacted by taking down the cartoon.
  https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7342676/varastatud-valimised
  https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7343276/margit-sutrop-eetiku-pilgu-labi-mis-on-postimehe-pilapildil-valesti
  https://arvamus.postimees.ee/7342960/peatoimetaja-marti-aavik-postimees-ei-kahtle-e-valimiste-usaldusvaarsuses
  https://objektiiv.ee/karikatuur-oravast-ja-karikatuurist/
• [2021-09-09] A research article by Sven Heiberg (SCCEIV), Kristjan Krips (Cybernetica/UT), Jan Willemson (Cybernetica/STACC) and Priit Vinkel (Cybernetica/VVK): “Facial Recognition for Remote Electronic Voting – Missing Piece of the Puzzle or Yet Another Liability?”. The authors studied the applicability of facial recognition for verifying voter identities (not specifically for the Estonian i-voting context). The architectural aspects and the main technical and ethical issues were discussed.
  https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1143
  https://twitter.com/krips_k/status/1437413997393874950
  https://cyber.ee/resources/stories/facial-recognition-elections-biometrics/
• [2021-09-05] A research article by Bingsheng Zhang (Zhejiang University), Zengpeng Li (Shandong University) and Jan Willemson (Cybernetica): “UC Modelling and Security Analysis of the Estonian IVXV Internet Voting System”. The authors claim that the Estonian i-voting system achieves end-to-end verifiability in practice despite the fact that only 4% (on average) of the i-voters verify their votes.
  https://arxiv.org/pdf/2109.01994.pdf
• [2021-08-28] A research article by Arne Koitmäe (VVK), Jan Willemson (Cybernetica) and Priit Vinkel (Cybernetica): “Vote Secrecy and Voter Feedback in Remote Voting – Can We Have Both?”. The authors discuss the possibility for introducing a feedback channel that would inform a person if someone (or the person themselves) has cast an i-vote in their name. The Estonian i-voting system is used as an example for discussing the possible feedback channel.
  https://research.cyber.ee/~janwil/publ/Vote-Secrecy.pdf
  https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-86942-7_10
• [2021-08-25] A Belgian cryptographer (Olivier Pereira) described a variant of the revoting attack for the vote verification feature of the Estonian i-voting. By forcing a voter to revote (e.g., by simulating a voting application crash before the verification QR code is shown), on revote a malicious voting application can display the verification QR code from the previous (non-modified) vote cast by the voter, while the revote is substituted with the attacker’s candidate. The benefit compared to the silent revoting is that malware does not have to interact with the ID card (or compromise the voter’s phone in the case of Mobile-ID). An obvious fix is for the i-voting system to allow the verification of the last vote only. The developers of the i-voting system have implemented such a feature, but this feature was not enabled by VVK for the local elections.
  https://nitter.eu/ikubjas/status/1430875590677123072#m
  https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1098