[2020-12-30] A new version of the Election Information System (VIS) is being developed which will introduce an electronic list of voters making it possible to cancel an already given i-vote on election day with a paper vote. News portal Geenius tried to establish whether the authorities are performing background checks on the employees of private companies, Nortal and Cybernetica, involved in the development of the information systems for elections. Not clear whether such checks are needed as the security of the elections should not depend on the integrity of the developers. https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/kas-valimiste-infosusteemide-arendajate-taust-on-riigile-teada-riigiasutused-keerutavad/
[2020-12-28] Arnis Parsovs (UT) has published the draft of his PhD dissertation “Estonian Electronic ID card and its Security Challenges”. https://cybersec.ee/storage/phd_idcard.pdf
[2020-12-16] For years, an IT employee with a state secret permit mined cryptocurrency at the Ämari air base, bought expensive equipment with the Estonian defense budget and smuggled computer components out of the base to sell them in online forums. The purchased goods were not accounted for in the air monitoring division. From 2015 until his arrest in January 2019, the man illegally used devices belonging to the Defense Forces to extract cryptocurrencies worth 30,404 euros and misappropriated at least 190 devices with the total value of 48,935 euros. https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/91976323/it-mees-armaani-tegi-eesti-kaitserahaga-osturallit-ja-avas-amaris-salajase-kruptorahakaevanduse
[2020-12-08] The Ministry of Interior sells the residence addresses entered in the population register to commercial enterprises for the purpose of sending advertisements or invitations to participate in surveys. Names, e-mail addresses, dates of birth and personal identification codes are not disclosed to the companies, but the addresses can be purchased by specifying the characteristics such as age, gender and mother tongue. People can opt-out by restricting access to their data in the e-service at rahvastikuregister.ee. In 2019, the data was sold to five customers and the state earned 8,205 EUR. https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/riik-muutis-inimeste-aadressid-ariks-siseministeerium-muub-rahvastikuregistri-andmeid-otsepostitusfirmadele?id=91904305
[2020-12-07] The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) allowed an active intelligence officer to give an interview to Postimees. The interview followed strict secrecy rules and Postimees did not learn the agent’s identity. This activity is likely related to the job ads recently put out by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service. https://news.postimees.ee/7127281/estonian-intelligence-operative-our-special-tool-is-our-brain
[2020-12-07] The 6th Interdisciplinary Cyber Research conference took place in a semi-online format. The video recordings and proceedings are available. https://www.taltech.ee/en/icr2020
[2020-12-01] RIA is developing an environment which will provide the possibility of installing additional smart card applications on the ID card. There are about four companies working on the creation of apps. The proof of concept will be completed by March 2021. RIA will not charge for apps, but it is possible that the use of the app will require a certain fee to be paid to the companies providing the apps. https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/tulevast-aastast-saab-id-kaardile-appe-installida/
[2020-11-27] EveryPay AS, which offers payment solutions for Estonian e-shops (used by mTasku), made a mistake which resulted in the bank accounts for a few hundred people being emptied. According to the company, it was a human error in the development which the automatic tests did not catch. All affected customers have received a refund. https://raha.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/eesti-maksevahendaja-eksitus-tuhjendas-monesaja-inimese-pangakonto/
[2020-11-12] SK ID Solutions AS annual conference was replaced with a video presentation. Among the topics covered: SK team has grown; Smart-ID solution is to be implemented in Iceland; SK has teamed up with TalTech to pre-emptively identify and counter phishing scams. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2BBgScfRy0k
[2020-10-29] In the second half of July this year, a new way of banking fraud began to spread – telephone phishing calls. As of the beginning of October, the police has reported 90 cases in which fraudsters have been able to cause damage totaling 200,000 euros. Criminals spoof a bank’s Caller ID, use waiting music, read out the customer’s personal identification code or other personal data, and use all means to create the illusion that the victim is indeed talking to a bank employee. The criminals create fear and state that an action is urgently needed. The victim’s phone receives Mobile-ID or Smart-ID authentication requests and the victim thinks that he is being identified by a bank employee. Scammers are speaking Russian and the victims are mainly the Russian-speaking customers. From the audio recording of the fraudulent call to Swedbank, it is possible to hear that the scammers operate a call center – in the background similar calls can be heard being made to other potential victims. Also the phishing e-mails sent on behalf of banks are once again spreading. https://tarbija24.postimees.ee/7063755/pank-hoiatab-petukonede-ja-petusonumite-eest https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/sagenenud-venekeelsed-telefonikoned-raha-valja-petmiseks.html https://www.err.ee/1153036/pangapettuste-ohvriks-langevad-enamasti-venekeelsed-kliendid https://news.err.ee/1153654/ppa-ria-warn-against-phishing-letters-spread-on-behalf-of-banks
[2020-10-16] A recent audit conducted by the Data Protection Inspectorate (AKI) finds that local municipality governments often unjustifiably mark documents as “information intended for internal use”. Most commonly the wage of employees and their vacation information is hidden. There are rumors that when signing an agreement, some personal information is included on purpose so that access restrictions could be applied. At the same time, there are plenty documents available to the public, containing the full names and contacts of private persons. Sometimes personal data leaks by including personal data in the public title of a non-public document. https://news.err.ee/1147941/data-protection-inspectorate-local-governments-cover-for-officials
[2020-09-25] A research article by Mihkel Solvak (UT): “Does vote verification work: usage and impact of confidence building technology in Internet voting”. The study finds that: i-vote verifiers are younger males and Linux users with the verification rate especially high in the 18 to 40 age group; voting from abroad clearly leads to more verification; the cast-as-intended verification leads to higher confidence that ones vote was taken into account. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-60347-2_14
[2020-09-18] From August, RIA started monitoring procedures for the implementation of information security measures for all critical databases in Estonia. A total of ten critical databases have been defined: e-file (e-toimik), land register, commercial register, Riigi Teataja information system, land cadastre, state treasury information system, taxpayer register, population register, register of identity documents and state pension insurance register. https://www.ria.ee/et/uudised/olukord-kuberruumis-august-2020.html
[2020-09-17] The investigative journalism show “Pealtnägija” investigated a scam of fictitious real estate ads targeted at foreign students. While the victims believed that they were transferring money as a deposit for an apartment, they effectively paid an Estonian Bitcoin trader for the scammer’s purchase of bitcoins. https://news.err.ee/1136558/pealtnagija-foreign-students-falling-victim-to-fictitious-real-estate-ads
[2020-09-17] Government will revoke 10 citizenships acquired illegally as the result of a widespread fraud that was committed during the years of 2013-2015 by a criminal group involving PPA employees. Previously, Estonian citizenship has only been revoked once by a government decision in 2016. https://news.err.ee/1136097/government-to-revoke-10-citizenships-acquired-illegally
[2020-09-06] A research article by Valentyna Tsap (TalTech), Silvia Lips (TalTech) and Dirk Draheim (TalTech): “Analyzing eID Public Acceptance and User Preferences for Current Authentication Options in Estonia”. The study finds that the ID card is used the most to access e-services; Smart ID holds the second position; username/password and Mobile-ID shares the third choice. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-58957-8_12
[2020-09-01] Kaija Kirch, previously a document expert at the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board (PPA), now works for Cybernetica.
[2020-08-28] After two years, the court has not yet started to resolve the case of PPA vs Gemalto. In August 2019, a preliminary hearing was held where the possibility of finding a compromise was discussed. However, as of 2020-08-28 no compromise has been reached and both parties have submitted a number of different requests that the court has to resolve. https://forte.delfi.ee/news/tehnika/politsei-vs-gemalto-kaks-aastat-kohtuveskeid-ja-ei-tuhjagi?id=90871257
[2020-08-25] BSc thesis by Sander-Karl Kivivare (UT): “Secure Channel Establishment for the NFC Interface of the New Generation Estonian ID Cards”. The thesis describes the cryptographic protocol that is used to communicate with the Estonian ID card over the contactless interface and provides detailed instructions with code examples in Python, to help software developers create applications that can make use of the new NFC interface introduced in the ID cards issued since December 2018. https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=70557&year=2020&language=en https://github.com/Kivivares/estid-nfc
[2020-08-25] BSc thesis by Jekaterina Gorohhova (UT): “Malicious Android app for security testing”. In the context of this thesis, an Android app was developed to demonstrate how a malicious app with a given set of Android permissions can abuse them to collect personal data stored on a user’s device and then send it out. https://comserv.cs.ut.ee/ati_thesis/datasheet.php?id=70525&year=2020&language=en
[2020-08-20] July statistics from the state authentication service TARA show that Smart-ID became the most popular identification tool outperforming the ID card. The number of government agencies using TARA in their e-services is currently between 30-40, but RIA expects it to grow to over a hundred. RIA plans to remove the banklink authentication option from TARA at the end of 2020, as the banks are accessed by the same ID card, Mobile-ID and Smart-ID that are directly supported by TARA as well. https://forte.delfi.ee/news/digi/smart-id-tousis-koige-populaarsemaks-tuvastusvahendiks-eesti-riigi-e-teenustes?id=90789775
[2020-08-14] Research article by Arnis Parsovs (UT): “Estonian Electronic Identity Card: Security Flaws in Key Management”. The article, among other things, provides details about the malpractice of the Estonian ID card manufacturer Gemalto in generating private keys outside the ID card. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/parsovs
[2020-08-13] Tartu County Court convicted Dennis Einasto of computer fraud that caused nearly €28,500 in damages, of illegally obtaining access to computer systems and of large-scale money laundering. Overall, he was sentenced to 4.5 years in jail. Einasto’s computer contained cryptocurrency and web hosting databases hosting large numbers of usernames and passwords, but which did not belong to him. The cyber crimes were committed on an international scale. https://news.err.ee/1123315/tartu-county-court-convicts-man-of-cyber-crime-money-laundering
[2020-08-05] The passwords and e-mail addresses of 27,000 users of an unnamed Estonian advertising portal was leaked. The data was accessible for almost a year without the portal being aware of it. The portal has informed users about the leak and the same account data can no longer be used to enter the environment. Although the portal did not inform the Personal Data Inspectorate (AKI) in time, AKI has not yet made a decision on whether supervision proceedings should be initiated. https://digi.geenius.ee/rubriik/uudis/27-000-eestlase-paroolid-lekkisid-portaal-kuulis-lekkest-aasta-parast-selle-toimumist/
[2020-07-21] The government has made amendments to the “Statutes of the Health Information System” allowing the authentication of subjects using “ID card, Mobile-ID, Smart-ID or other equivalent device”. Historically, access to the Health Information System has only been granted based on authentication using the ID card. The security requirements have likely been relaxed due to the pressing coronavirus situation. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/118072020004
[2020-07-10] Research article by Kaido Kikkas (TalTech) and Birgy Lorenz (TalTech): “Training Young Cybersecurity Talents – The Case of Estonia”. The paper describes the Estonian experience with the CyberOlympics/CyberSpike program from 2017–2019 and reflects on the lessons learned about talent building in cybersecurity. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-50729-9_36
[2019-12-19] A research paper by Abasi-amefon Affia (UT): “Assessing the NFC Unlock Mechanism of the Tartu Smart Bike Share System”. The paper describes a flaw in the Tartu Smart Bike Share System that can be exploited to create a clone of a victim’s Tartu bus card, which can then be used to unlock the bikes. To create the clone, only the card number printed on the victim’s Tartu bus card is needed (valid numbers can be guessed). The flaw has now been partially mitigated as cloning is still possible, but the task is not that trivial. https://kodu.ut.ee/~arnis/bikeshare_nfc.pdf